Perspectives on Mind

ISBN-13: 9789027726407 / Angielski / Twarda / 1987 / 420 str.

H. R. Otto; J. Tuedio; Herbert R. Otto

Opis

Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. Generally, the skirmishes seem more "political" than philosophical, as when one side ridicules the methods of the other or criticizes the viability of the other's issues and assump- tions. Analytic interest in third person objectivity is often spurned by Continental philosophers as being unduly abstract. Continental interest in first person subjectivity is often criticized by analysts as being muddled and imprecise. Logical analysis confronts the power of metaphor and judges it "too ambiguous" for rigorous philosophical activity. The language of metaphor confronts the power of logical analysis and deems it "too restric- tive" for describing the nature and structures of authentic human exper- ience. But are the two approaches really incompatible? Perhaps because each side of the "divide" has been working at problems largely uninteresting to the "opposition" it has been easy to ignore or underestimate the importance of this issue. But now each side is being led into a common field of problems associated with the nature of mind, and there is a new urgency to the need for examining carefully the question of conceptual compatibility and the potential for dialogue. Analytic thinkers are typically in the business of concept clarification and objective certi- fication. Continental philosophers employ introspection in the interest of a project of description and classification that aims to be true to the full subtlety and complexity of the human condition.

Spis treści

One: Brain States, Machine States, and Consciousness.- 1.1 Consciousness.- A Question About Consciousness.- Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness.- 1.2 Correspondence.- Brain States and Psychological Phenomena.- Psychophysical Correspondence: Sense and Nonsense.- 1.3 Representation.- Husserl and the Representational Theory of Mind.- Meaning and Mental Representation.- Husserl’s Epiphenomenology.- Two: Structures of Mental Processing.- 2.1 Qualia.- Testing Robots for Qualia.- Qualia, Functional Equivalence, and Computation.- Animals, Qualia, and Robots.- 2.2 Intentionality.- Mechanism and Intentionality: The New World Knot.- Knotty, Knotty: Comments on Nelson’s “New World Knot”.- Intentionality, Folk Psychology, and Reduction.- 2.3 Transaction.- Intentional Transaction as a Primary Structure of Mind.- Sophist vs. Skeptic: Two Paradigms of Intentional Transaction.- Commentary on Tuedio’s “Intentional Transaction”.- 3. Mind, Meaning, and Language.- 3.1 Schemas.- Schemas, Cognition, and Language: Toward a Naturalist Account of Mind.- Naturalism, Schemas, and the Real Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Cognitive Science.- Schemas, Persons, and Reality—A Rejoinder.- 3.2 Background.- Background Knowledge and Natural Language Understanding.- Internality, Externality, and Intentionality.- Objects and Fields.- 3.3 Translation.- Meaning Making: Some Functional Aspects.- Comments on Otto on Translation.- Blindness to Silence: Some Dysfunctional Aspects of Meaning Making.- Four: Prospects for Dialogue and Synthesis.- 4.1 Convergence.- Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and the Psychological Sciences.- The Soft Impeachment: Responding to Margolis.- In Defense of Pluralism.- 4.2 Dialogue.- Epilogue: Toward A New Agenda for Philosophy of Mind.- Appendices.- Footnotes.- Name Index.- List of Authors.