Perfect Deterrence

ISBN-13: 9780521787130 / Angielski / Miękka / 2000 / 442 str.

Frank C. Zagare; D. Marc Kilgour; Steve Smith

Opis

This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace.

Recenzje

'Perfect Deterrence is the most insightful and comprehensive book on modern deterrence theory ever written. It is also amazingly accessible. I can't imagine teaching a graduate or advanced undergraduate course in either international relations or security without it.' George Downs, New York University

Spis treści

Part I. Theoretical Underpinnings: 1. Classical deterrence theory; 2. Rationality and deterrence; 3. Credibility: the magic ingredient of deterrence; Part II. Direct Deterrence: 4. Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5. Unilateral deterrence; Part III. Extended Deterrence: 6. Extended deterrence; 7. Modeling massive retaliation; 8. Modeling flexible response; 9. Crisis, escalation, and limited war; Part IV. Implications: 10. Perfect deterrence theory.