'Virginia Oliveros provides an essential reading for all scholars interested in the use of patronage for political gain. This is the most sophisticated and best documented research on patronage politics, presenting overwhelming evidence that partisan public employees can benefit their employers and also provide a higher level of effort on the job. Indeed, away from prior simplifications, patronage can have negative effects on democratic representation and also provide a higher level of service to voters. Now, that is something worth discussing!' Ernesto Calvo, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
1. Introduction; 2. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage; 3 Getting the Job; 4. Patronage Contracts and Political Services: Evidence from List Experiments; 5. Patronage, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration; 6. Self- Enforcing Patronage Contracts; 7. Beyond the Argentine Case; 8. Conclusions and Broader Implications.