Overlapping Structures as a Model of Money: An Analytical Review

ISBN-13: 9783642457159 / Angielski / Miękka / 2012 / 242 str.

Bruno Sch Nfelder

Opis

The book reviews monetary applications of overlapping gene- rations models and models with cash-in-advance constraints. It focuses on the implications for monetary economics. It tries to make sense of the available indeterminancy propositions. They are the most puzzling property of OGMs. The book surveys and synthesizes most of the available research papers. Assesses the usefulness of the approach for the advancement of monetary economics. The book can be used as a non-technical introductory text, which relies foremost on intuitive arguments.

Spis treści

1. Introduction.- 1.1. The “Integration of Monetary and Value Theory”.- 1.2. The Concept of an “Overlapping Structure”.- 1.3. The Purpose of this Book.- 2. The Overlapping Generation Model: An Overview.- 2.1. The Samuelson-Model.- 2.1.1. The Physical Set-up, Pseudo-Laissez faire, “Bubbles”, and Ponzi-Schemes.- 2.1.2. Three Equilibrium Concepts.- 2.1.3. Perfect Foresight Equilibrium.- 2.1.4. Repudiation of Paper Money.- 2.1.5. Stochastic Rational Expectations Equilibrium I.- 2.1.6. A Digression: Historical Instances of Repudiation.- 2.1.7. Stochastic Rational Expectation Equilibrium II.- 2.1.8. Stochastic Rational Expectation Equilibrium III.- 2.1.9. Temporary Equilibrium.- 2.1.10. Learning a Rational Expectation Equilibrium.- 2.2. OGMs with Production and Capital.- 2.2.1. The Diamond-Tirole Model.- 2.2.2. A Diamond-Model with Spatial Separation.- 2.2.3. The Indetermincay of Equilibrium in the Diamond-Tirole-Model.- 2.2.4. Deterministic Cycles.- 2.3. Generalizations of the Basic Model.- 2.3.1. Models with a Variable Quantity of Money.- 2.3.2. Enlargement of the Commodity Space and Lengthening the Live Spans of Agents Beyond Two Periods.- 2.3.3. Bequests.- 2.3.4. Stochastic Versions of the OGM.- 2.4. The Interpretation of Indeterminacy.- 2.4.1. Selection Criterions.- 2.4.2. A Strategy of Neglect.- 2.4.3. Do Multiple Equilibria Indicate the Incompleteness of the Theory?.- 2.4.4. Indeterminacy as Instability.- 2.4.5. Indeterminacy as Neutrality of “Stability”.- 2.4.6. Is Indeterminacy a Reason to Dismiss the Model?.- 2.5. Concluding Remark.- 3. Overlapping Structures and Cash-In-Advance Constraints.- 3.1. Cass’ Theorems.- 3.2. The Analogy between the Samuelson Model and a Simple Cash-in-Advance Constraint Model.- 3.3. A Physical Structure which Generates Cash-in-Advance Constraints.- 4. The Rate of Return Paradox I: OGM with Transaction Costs.- 4.1. A Transaction Costs Model by Bryant and Wallace.- 4.2. Difficulties of Identifying Safe Assets and the Rate of Return Paradox.- 4.3. Baumol’s Inventory Model of Money.- 4.4. A Concluding Remark.- 5. The Rate of Return Paradox II: “Legal Restrictions”.- 5.1. “Legal Restrictions” in the FR Germany.- 5.2. Implications of the Legal Restriction Theory.- 5.3. Some Observations from Monetary History and the Present.- 5.3.1. The Bons de la Defence Nationale.- 5.3.2. Interest on Checkable Deposits: The American Example.- 5.3.3. Rate of Return Differentials and Laissez Faire Banking.- 5.3.4. Summary.- 5.4. Legal restrictions as an Expedient for Levying the Inflation Tax.- 5.5. Minimum Reserve Requirements and Indeterminacy.- 5.5.1. Tirole’s Analysis.- 5.5.2. Interest on (Minimum) Reserves.- 5.5.3. The Svensson and Englund-Model.- 5.6. Minimum Sizes for Privately Issued Bearer’s Notes.- 5.7. Holding out the Prospect of Backing.- 5.8. Concluding Remark.- 6. Private Production of Outside Money.- 6.1. Competition between Private Producers of Fiat Money.- 6.2. Money as a Natural Monopoly.- 6.3. Gresham’s Law.- 6.4. Concluding Remark.- 7. Topics in Commodity Money Theory.- 7.1. A Model of a Gold Specie Standard.- 7.1.1. The Physical Environment and Equilibrium.- 7.1.2. Two Cash-in-advance Constraint Models.- 7.1.3. Inefficiency of Commodity Money.- 7.2. The Quantity Theory of Money.- 7.3. Uniqueness of Equilibrium.- 7.3.1. Some Generalizations of the Model.- 7.3.2. Parallel Currency.- 7.3.3. Gresham’s “Law”.- 7.3.4. Symmetallism and Graham-Plan.- 7.4. Restrictions on the Production of Inside Money.- 7.4.1. Scottish Banking Revisited.- 7.5. Commodity Money without Reserves.- 8. A Few Macroeconomic Applications.- 8.1. A Model with Non-Interest Bearing Money and Interest-Bearing Public Debt.- 8.2. “Backed” and “Unbacked” Public Debt.- 8.3. A Simple Model with Cash-in-advance Constraints and Credit Goods.- 8.4. The Distinction between Outside and Inside Money.- 8.5. The Fisher Effect.- 8.6. Grandmont-Policy.- 9. Monetary Policy in The Open Economy.- 9.1. The Kareken and Wallace Model.- 9.1.1. The robustness of Kareken’s and Wallace’s Results.- 9.1.2. Preference for Domestic Currency and Sticky Prices.- 9.1.3. Uncertain Change of Regime.- 9.1.4. Minimum Reserve Requirements and Other Legal Restrictions.- 9.2. Stabilizing and Destabilizing Speculation.- 9.2.1. Speculation and Intrinsic Uncertainty.- 9.2.2. A Model with Extrinsic Uncertainty.- 9.3. Concluding Remark.- 10. Summary and Conclusions.- 10.1. Summary.- 10.2. Conclusions.

O autorze

Bruno Schönfelder hat Volkswirtschaftslehre und Slawistik an der Universität München und der University of Minnesota studiert; Promotion zum Dr. rer pol. 1984, Habilitation an der Volkswirtschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität München 1990, Lehrstuhlvertretung in Rostock 1991, Gründungsprofessor für VWL an der Bergakademie Freiberg 1992, dort derzeit Dekan der wirtschaftswiss. Fakultät, Forschungsinteressen: Volkswirtschaften postsozialistischer Länder Ostmitteleuropa und des Balkan.