On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)

ISBN-13: 9780792315360 / Angielski / Miękka / 1992 / 408 str.

Edmund Husserl; John Barnett Brough; Edmund Husserl

Opis

What follows is a translation of Volume X in the Husserliana series, the critical edition of the works of Edmund HusserI. I Volume X was published in 1966. Its editor, Rudolf Boehm, provided the title: Zur Phiinomen%gie des inneren Zeitbewusst seins (1893-1917). Some of the texts included in Volume X were published during HusserI's lifetime, but the majority were not. Given the fact that the materials assembled in Volume X do not constitute a single and previously published Husserlian work, some acquaintance with their history and chronology is indis pensable to understanding them. These introductory remarks are intended to provide the outlines of such an acquaintance, together with a brief account of the main themes that appear in the texts. The Status of the Texts In 1928, HusserI's "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins" appeared in the Jahrbuch fur Philoso- I Edmund Husserl, Zur Phiinomen%gie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893 1917) On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (l893 1917)I, herausgegeben von Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). The references in Roman numerals that occur in parentheses in this Introduction are to Rudolf Boehm's "Editor's Introduction" to Husserliana X. References in Arabic numerals, unless otherwise noted, will be to this translation. Corresponding page numbers of Husserliana X will be found in the margins of the translation. The translation includes Parts A and B of Husserliana X, with Boehm's notes.

Spis treści

A Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time.- First Part: The Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the Year 1905.- § 1. The Suspension of Objective Time.- § 2. The Question about the “ Origin of Time ”.- First Section: Brentano’s Theory of the Origin of Time.- § 3. The Original Associations.- § 4. The Acquiring of the Future and Infinite Time.- § 5. The Modification of Representations through Temporal Characters.- § 6. Criticism.- Second Section Analysis of the Consciousness of Time.- § 7. Interpretation of the Grasping of Temporal Objects as Momentary Grasping and as Enduring Act.- § 8. Immanent Temporal Objects and Their Modes of Appearance.- § 9. The Consciousness of the Appearances of Immanent Objects.- § 10. The Continua of the Running-Off Phenomena. The Diagram of Time.- § 11. Primal Impression and Retentional Modification.- § 12. Retention as a Unique Kind of Intentionality.- § 13. The Necessity that an Impression Precede Every Retention. Evidence Pertaining to Retention.- § 14. Reproduction of Temporal Objects (Secondary Memory).- § 15. Reproduction’s Modes of Accomplishment.- § 16. Perception as Presentation in Distinction from Retention and Recollection.- § 17. Perception as the Act That Gives Something Itself in Opposition to Reproduction.- § 18. The Significance of Recollection for the Constitution of the Consciousness of Duration and Succession.- § 19. The Difference between Retention and Reproduction (Primary and Secondary Memory or Phantasy).- § 20. The “ Freedom ” of Reproduction.- § 21. Levels of Clarity Pertaining to Reproduction.- § 22. Evidence of Reproduction.- § 23. Coinciding of the Reproduced Now with a Past. Distinction between Phantasy and Recollection.- § 24. Protentions in Recollection.- § 25. The Double Intentionality of Recollection.- § 26. Differences between Memory and Expectation.- § 27. Memory as Consciousness of Having-Been-Perceived.- § 28. Memory and Image-Consciousness. Memory as Positing Reproduction.- § 29. Memory of the Present.- § 30. The Preservation of the Objective Intention in the Retentional Modification.- § 31. Primal Impression and the Objective Individual Time-Point.- § 32. The Role of Reproduction in the Constitution of the One Objective Time.- § 33. Some A Priori Temporal Laws.- Third Section The Levels of Constitution Pertaining to Time and Temporal Objects.- § 34. Differentiation of the Levels of Constitution.- § 35. Differences between Constituted Unities and the Constituting Flow.- § 36. The Time-Constituting Flow as Absolute Subjectivity.- § 37. Appearances of Transcendent Objects as Constituted Unities.- § 38. The Unity of the Flow of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession.- § 39. The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flow of Consciousness.- § 40. The Constituted Immanent Contents.- § 41. Evidence Pertaining to Immanent Contents. Change and Constancy.- § 42. Impression and Reproduction.- § 43. Constitution of Physical-Thing Appearances and of Physical Things. Constituted Apprehensions and Primal Apprehensions.- § 44. Perception of the Internal and Perception of the External.- § 45. Constitution of Nontemporal Transcendencies.- Second Part: Addenda and Supplements to the Analysis of Time-Consciousness from the Years 1905–1910.- Appendix I : Primal Impression and Its Continuum of Modifications.- Appendix II : Re-presentation and Phantasy. — Impression and Imagination.- Appendix III : The Nexus-Intentions of Perception and Memory. — The Modes of Time-Consciousness.- Appendix IV : Recollection and the Constitution of Temporal Objects and Objective Time.- Appendix V : Simultaneity of Perception and the Perceived.- Appendix VI : The Grasping of the Absolute Flow. — Perception in a Fourfold Sense.- Appendix VII : Constitution of Simultaneity.- Appendix VIII : The Double Intentionality of the Stream of Consciousness.- Appendix IX : Primal Consciousness and the Possibility of Reflection.- Appendix X : Objectivation of Time and of Something Physical in Time.- Appendix XI : Adequate and Inadequate Perception.- Appendix XII : Internal Consciousness and the Grasping of Experiences.- Appendix XIII : Constitution of Spontaneous Unities as Objects in Immanent Time. — Judgment as Temporal Formation and Absolute Time-constituting Consciousness.- B Supplementary Texts Setting Forth the Development if the Problem.- I. ?On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between “Fresh” Memory and “Full” Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time??From about 1893 to about 1901?.- No. 1. How Does the Unity of a Process of Change That Continues for an Extended Period of Time Come to Be Represented? ?Intuition and Re-presentation?.- No. 2. Evidence Pertaining to the Perception of Time, to Memory, etc.- No. 3. ?Adequate Expectation?.- No. 4. Meditation. ?Perception, Memory, and Expectation?.- No. 5. ?Enduring Perception as Simple Act? (1898–1900).- No. 6. ?Brentano and the Question about the Evidence of Memory?.- No. 7. Intuition, Evidence of Being-Past - Mere Representation of Being-Past. ?Apparent Necessity of Assuming a Change of Content in Primary Memory?.- No. 8. Adequation by Means of Similarity. — Representation of an Object and Representation of the Perception of the Object. ?What Is Still Given in Consciousness in “Faded” Fashion [Functioning] by Means of Similarity as Pictorial Représentant of What Was Previously Perceived?.- No. 9. Disputation. ?The Presentness of Memory, the Being-Past of What Is Remembered?.- No. 10. Old and First Observation that an Essential Difference Exists between Original Consciousness of the Past and Recollection.- No. 11. Do the Momentary Phases of Perception Referring to the Elapsed Parts of the Temporal Object Have the Character of Imagination?.- No. 12. ?The Evidence of Time-Consciousness?.- No. 13. Perception of Something Temporal and Perception of Temporality.- No. 14. Whether the Intuitive Modification by Virtue of Which Immediate Memory Comes into Being out of Perception Can Be Understood as a Mere Change in the Presenting Content. (Brentano may serve simply as an example here).- No. 15. Time and Memory. ?Perception of the Now, Memorial Perception and Phantasy-Memory. Transferring of the Differences into the Mode of Apperception?.- No. 16. ?What Can Be Given as Present in One Perception?.- No. 17. ?The Problem of the Consciousness of Modification?.- No. 18. The Character of Memory. — Representation through Identity: What Is That Supposed to Mean?.- II. ?The Suspension of Objective Time, the Temporal Object, the Phenomenology of Objectivation and Its Aporiae? ?1904 and the Beginning of 1905?.- No. 19. ?The Complete Exclusion of All Suppositions with Respect to Objective Time? (1904).- No. 20. ?Perception of Succession Presupposes Succession of Perception? (Vacation, 1904).- No. 21. ?Recognizing on the Basis of the Repeated Re-presentation of the Same Succession? (1904).- No. 22. Is (or How Is) Adequate Memory Possible? (Summer Vacation, 1904).- No. 23. The Unity of Time and Its Infinity.- No. 24. Perception of an Individual (Temporal) Object. ?Do We Find in One Phase of the Perception of Something Temporal the Perceptual Appearances of the Earlier Phases?? (September 1904).- No. 25. Adequate Memory. Earlier Perception. — Perception of the Past. Attempt ?Aporia?. ?Why Is Fresh Memory Not Simply the Original Perception Continuing to Endure??.- No. 26. On the Hypothesis : That Perceptions Include the “ Temporal Determination ” Actually Now, Which, However, Continually Changes, and That Primary Memory Has the Significance of the Abiding of These Perceptions211.- No. 27. ?Attempt at a Survey: the Fundamental Temporal Distinctions. There-itself and Objectivation?.- No. 28. The Identity of the Tone, of the Temporal Object, and of Each Phase of the Temporal Object in the Flow of Time-Consciousness.- No. 29. Meinong’s Distinction between Distributed and Undistributed Objects (January 7, 1905).- No. 30. ?Three Kinds of Phases?.- No. 31. Diagram. ?Apprehension of the Now and Extensive Perception?.- No. 32. Continua.- No. 33. Results of the Stern-Meinong Discussion.- No. 34. ?On the Problem of the Consciousness of a Succession? (February 1905).- III. Seefelder Manuscripts on Individuation 1905 ?until about 1907?.- No. 35. The Unity of the Thing in Time as Something Identical in Change or Constancy (Summer Vacation, 1905).- No. 36. ?On the? Seefeld Reflection. ?The Typical, the Mathematical, and the Unity of the Temporal Object?.- No. 37. The Temporal Object.- No. 38. Objection to This Whole Seefeld Way of Considering Things.- IV. ?On the Dissolution of the Schema: Apprehension-Content — Apprehension? ?1907 to 1909?.- No. 39. Time in Perception (?Beginning? 1907).- No. 40. Levels of Objectivity.- No. 41. Appearance and Time. — Experiencing and Experience. Consciousness as the Experiencing in Which the Experiences Belonging to Consciousness Are Experienced in the Plural.- No. 42. Evidence.- No. 43. Problem.- No. 44. The Temporal Form of Consciousness.- No. 45. ?The Double Intentionality of the Flows of Consciousness?.- No. 46. ?Questionableness of Tracing All Differences Back to the Mode of Apprehension?.- No. 47. ? “Content-moments” and “Apprehension-moments” and the Evidence of Fresh Memory?.- No. 48. The Original Process of Being Pushed Back in Time . . 330 No. 49. ?Do We Have a Continuum of Primary Contents Simultaneously in the Now-point and, in Addition to This and Simultaneous with It, a Continuum of “Apprehensions”??.- No. 50. The Modification Proper to Primary Memory.- V. ?On the Primary Conclusion of the Investigations? ?Beginning of? 1909 to the End of 1911.- No. 51. ?The Problem of Time in the Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology? (May-June 1909).- No. 52. Mere Representations of Processes or of Individual (Enduring) Objects. Evidence Pertaining to Memorial Perception, Evidence Pertaining to the Perception of What Is Present (End of August 1909).- No. 53. The Intentionality of Internal Consciousness (November 10–13, 1911).- No. 54. ?Consciousness (Flow), Appearance (Immanent Object [Object]), and Object [Gegenstand]?.