Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility

ISBN-13: 9780199347520 / Angielski / Twarda / 2014 / 238 str.

Randolph Clarke

Opis

Philosophical theories of agency and responsibility have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. Omitting or refraining, like acting, can have consequences, good and bad. And we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for omitting or refraining. However, omitting and refraining are not simply special cases of action; they require their own distinctive treatment.

In Omissions, Randolph Clarke offers the first comprehensive account of these phenomena, addressing three main questions: What is an omission? What is it to intentionally not do a certain thing? And what does it take to be morally responsible for omitting or refraining? Clarke examines the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction between doing and allowing, and the distinction in law between act and omission. With its attention to a previously neglected topic, Omissions broadens our understanding of human agency.

Recenzje

This is a rich, dense, well-written, and thought-provoking book on a very important topic that has not received the kind of systematic attention that it deserves It is a testament to Clarke's versatility and virtuosity that he is able to integrate discussion of these matters into a largely seamless and philosophically rewarding whole Combining, as it does, clever moves with illuminating cases, and all without a hint of arrogance or posturing, the book is a rewarding read and a very valuable contribution to the literature on the nature of, and moral and legal responsibility for, omissions and their consequences.

O autorze

Randolph Clarke is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (OUP 2003) and numerous articles on agency, free will, and moral responsibility.