Noneist Explorations I: The Sylvan Jungle - Volume 2

ISBN-13: 9783030263072 / Angielski / Twarda / 2019 / 417 str.

Richard Routley; Dominic Hyde; Ross Brady

Spis treści

Editors’ Preface

Contributors

Introduction: Some Personal Reflections – Priest

Original Material

First Edition Front Matter [Abridged]

Acknowledgements

Chapter 2. Exploring Meinong’s jungle and beyond. II. Existence and identity when times change

Chapter 3. On what there isn’t

Chapter 4. Further objections to the theory of items disarmed

Chapter 5. Three Meinongs

Chapter 6. The theory of objects as commonsense

Chapter 7. The problems of fiction and fictions

Bibliography

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS

A critique of Meinongian semantics – Smart

Routley’s theory of fictions – Reicher

Routley’s second thoughts – Kroon

Index

O autorze

Richard Routley/Sylvan (1935-1996), a New Zealand born philosopher, who was a research fellow at the Australian National University at the time of his death, rose to prominence for his work in the development of Relevance Logic, Deep Ecology and a revised and improved Meinongian ontology known as “noneism.”  An iconoclastic figure in Australian philosophy, Routley/Sylvan’s legacy thrives in the views of students and colleagues worldwide.

Dominic Hyde is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at The University of Queensland whose works include: Vagueness, Logic and Ontology (2008), and Eco-Logical Lives: the philosophical lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood (2014). He works in non-classical logic and environmental philosophy and in environmental conservation.

Blurb

This second volume continues Richard Routley’s explorations of an improved Meinongian account of non-referring and intensional discourse (including joint work with Val Routley, later Val Plumwood). It focuses on the essays 2 through 7 of the original monograph, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, following on from the material of the first volume and explores its implications of the Noneist position. It begins with a further development of noneism in the direction of an ontologically neutral chronological logic and associated metaphysical issues concerning existence and change.

What follows includes: a detailed response to Quine’s On What There Is; a defense against further objections to noneism; a detailed account of Meinong’s own position; arguments in favour of noneism from common-sense; and a noneist analysis of fictional discourse.

We present these essays separately and provide additional scholarly commentaries from a range of philosophers including Fred Kroon, Maria Elisabeth Reicher-Marek and a previously unpublished commentary on noneism by J.J.C. Smart.