Non-Cooperative Planning Theory

ISBN-13: 9783540583615 / Angielski / Miękka / 1994 / 309 str.

Peter Bogetoft

Opis

This introduction to the field stresses how strategic behaviour and opportunism may impede planning, and how this problem can be solved by the organization of communication and decision-making, the design of control and information systems, and the development of incentive schemes.

Spis treści

1: Introduction.- 1. Basic Concepts and Approaches.- 1.1. Planning and Incentives.- 1.2. Decision Theory.- 1.3. Social Choice Theory.- 1.4. Game Theory.- 1.5. Implementation Theory.- 1.6. Agency Theory.- 1.7. An Overview of the Book.- 1.8. Alternative Approaches to Planning.- 1.9. Conclusions.- 2: Information and Communication.- 2. Bayesian Games and Implementation.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Bayesian Games.- 2.3. Bayesian Games with Communication.- 2.4. The Evaluation of Planning Schemes.- 2.5. Bayesian Implementation and Revelation.- 2.6. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 3. Organization of Communication.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. Superior Organizations.- 3.3. More or Less Communication.- 3.4. Simultaneous or Sequential Communication.- 3.5. Prior or Posterior Communication.- 3.6. Contingent or Fixed Decisions.- 3.7. Multiple or Single Issue Decisions.- 3.8. An Example.- 3.9. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 3: Delegated Decision Making.- 4. Choice-Implementation Models.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. The Choice-Implementation Problem.- 4.3. The Pure Implementation Problem.- 4.4. Additional Simplifications.- 4.5. The Elimination of Choice-Implementation Preplay.- 4.6. Conclusions.- 5. Sufficient and Robust Information.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. Preliminaries.- 5.3. Sufficient Statistics.- 5.4. The Sufficiency of Sufficient Statistics.- 5.5. The Necessity of Sufficient Statistics.- 5.6. Robust Information Systems.- 5.7. The Robustness of Sufficient Statistics.- 5.8. An Example.- 5.9. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 6. Finer, Complete and Ancillary Information.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. Finer Statistics.- 6.3. Complete Statistics.- 6.4. Ancillary Statistics.- 6.5. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 7. Non-Verifiable Information.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. Preliminaries.- 7.3. Mean Preserving Spread Increases.- 7.4. The First Order Characterization.- 7.5. The Value of Non-Verifiable Information.- 7.6. The Noah’s Ark Case.- 7.7. A Numerical Example.- 7.8. Conclusions 158 Mathematical Appendix.- 4: Delegated Information Production.- 8. Information Production Models.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. Delegated Production of Verifiable Information.- 8.3. Delegated Production of Non-Verifiable Information.- 8.4. The Information Production Mechanism.- 8.5. Information Production and Information Use.- 8.6. Conclusions.- 9. Incentives in Information Production.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Private Information and Communication.- 9.3. The Incentive Issue.- 9.4. The Structure of Optimal Incentives.- 9.5. Incentives in Binary Models.- 9.6. Additional Public Information.- 9.7. Additional Private Information.- 9.8. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 10. Organization of Information Production.- 10.1. Introduction.- 10.2. Finer Investigations.- 10.3. Parallel Investigations.- 10.4. Parallelism in Binary Model.- 10.5. Sequential Investigations.- 10.6. Conclusions 235 Mathematical Appendix.- 5: Evaluation of Specific Schemes.- 11. Incentives and Productivity Measures.- 11.1. Introduction.- 11.2. OR and Incentives.- 11.3. Data Envelopment Analysis.- 11.4. The Incentive Problem.- 11.5. Sufficient Production Frontiers.- 11.6. An Example.- 11.7. Further Results.- 11.8. Conclusions.- Mathematical Appendix.- 6: Summary and Conclusions.- 12. Summary and Conclusions.- 12.1. Introduction.- 12.2. Related Theories.- 12.3. Information and Communication.- 12.4. Delegated Decision Making.- 12.5. Delegated Information Production.- 12.6. Evaluation of Specific Schemes.- 12.7. Partial and Simplified Models.- 12.8. Conclusions.- Bibliographic Appendix.- References.