This book reveals the nature and level of British engagement with controversial and lethal nerve agent weapons from the end of the Second World War to Britain’s submission of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. At the very heart of this highly secretive aspect of British defence policy were fundamental questions over whether Britain should acquire nerve agent weapons for potential first-use against the Soviet Union, retain them purely for their deterrence value, or drive for either unilateral or international chemical weapons disarmament. These considerations and concerns over nerve agent weapons were not limited to low-level defence committees, nor were they consigned to the periphery, but featured prominently at the highest levels of the British government and defence planning. Importantly, and despite stringent secrecy, the book further uncovers how public scrutiny and protest movements played a substantial and successful part in influencing policy and attitudes towards nerve agent weapons.
Chapter 2. British Defence Policy and the Nerve Agents in Postwar Britain, 1945–1950.
Chapter 3. A Step Too Far: The Nerve Agents and the Global Strategy Paper, 1951–1953
Chapter 4. Drift, Decline, and a Stubborn Prime Minister, 1954–1957
Chapter 5. Another Reverse Course: From Dependence to Acquisition, 1958–1963
Chapter 6. A ‘Secret Deterrent’ and a ‘Campaign of Criticism’, 1964–1969
Chapter 7. From the CS Debacle to the rise of CW disarmament, 1970–1976
Chapter 8. Conclusion: From Discovery to Disarmament
William Kingis a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute London, UK.
“Nerve agents in Postwar Britain presents a fascinating history of the twists and turns of the UK’s policy on chemical weapons.”
—Hassan Elbahtimy, Senior Lecturer, War Studies Department, King's College London, UK
“This is a compelling story. The archives King has analysed show British ministers and officials in frequent discomfort, torn between military secrecy and public scrutiny, never sure what nerve agent capabilities the other side held or how best to deter their use in war.”
—Nicholas Sims, Emeritus Reader in International Relations, The London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
"King’s thoroughly researched and ground-breaking account charts the development of nerve agent policy in the UK from 1945 to 1976. His work not only fills a significant gap in the history of chemical warfare, but will be invaluable for understanding UK Cold War defence policy more generally."
—Brian Balmer, Professor of Science Policy Studies, Department of Science & Technology Studies, University College London, UK
This book reveals the nature and level of British engagement with controversial and lethal nerve agent weapons from the end of the Second World War to Britain’s submission of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. At the very heart of this highly secretive aspect of British defence policy were fundamental questions over whether Britain should acquire nerve agent weapons for potential first-use against the Soviet Union, retain them purely for their deterrence value, or drive for either unilateral or international chemical weapons disarmament. These considerations and concerns over nerve agent weapons were not limited to low-level defence committees, nor were they consigned to the periphery, but featured prominently at the highest levels of the British government and defence planning. Importantly, and despite stringent secrecy, the book further uncovers how public scrutiny and protest movements played a substantial and successful part in influencing policy and attitudes towards nerve agent weapons.
William King is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute London, UK.