National Strategy for Counterterrorism: June 2011

ISBN-13: 9781482679175 / Angielski / Miękka / 2013 / 24 str.

The White House

Opis

As the President affirmed in his 2010 National Security Strategy, he bears no greater responsibility than ensuring the safety and security of the American people. This National Strategy for Counterterrorism sets out our approach to one of the President's top national security priorities: disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens and interests. In response to the attacks of September 2001, the United States embarked on a national effort against al-Qa'ida, the transnational terrorist organization responsible for planning and conducting the attacks. As we approach the 10th anniversary of that day, we can look forward with confidence in our accomplishments and pride in the resiliency of our nation. We have prevented another catastrophic attack on our shores; our citizens have not let the specter of terrorism disrupt their daily lives and activities; our Federal government has worked to become more integrated, efficient, and effective in its counterterrorism (CT) efforts; and we have placed our CT campaign in a context that does not dominate the lives of the American people nor overshadow our approach to the broad range of our interests. Yet the paramount terrorist threat we have faced-al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents-has also continued to evolve, often in response to the successes of the United States and its partners around the world Our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have destroyed much of al-Qa'ida's leadership and weakened the organization substantially. Meanwhile, in recent years the source of the threat to the United States and its allies has shifted in part toward the periphery-to groups affiliated with but separate from the core of the group in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This also includes deliberate efforts by al-Qa'ida to inspire individuals within the United States to conduct attacks on their own. Therefore, this National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains our focus on pressuring al-Qa'ida's core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. At the same time, our strategy augments our focus on confronting the al-Qa'ida-linked threats that continue to emerge from beyond its core safehaven in South Asia. Since the beginning of 2011, the transformative change sweeping North Africa and the Middle East- along with the death of Usama bin Laden-has further changed the nature of the terrorist threat, particularly as the relevance of al-Qa'ida and its ideology has been further diminished Usama Bin Laden's persistent calls for violent regime change in the Arab World and perpetual violence against the United States and our allies as the method to empower Muslim populations stands in stark contrast to the nonviolent movements for change in the Middle East and North Africa. In just a few short months, those movements achieved far more political change than al-Qa'ida's years of violence, which has claimed thousands upon thousands of victims-most of them Muslim. To put it simply: We are bringing targeted force to bear on al-Qa'ida at a time when its ideology is also under extreme pressure. Nevertheless, we remain keenly vigilant to the threat al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and adherents pose to the United States. This Strategy articulates how we will achieve a future in which al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents are defeated-and their ideology ultimately meets the same fate as its founder and leader. This National Strategy for Counterterrorism articulates our government's approach to countering terrorism and identifies the range of tools critical to this Strategy's success. This Strategy builds on groundwork laid by previous strategies and many aspects of the United States Government's enduring approach to countering terrorism. At the same time, it outlines an approach that is more focused and specific than were previous strategies.

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