ISBN-13: 9780415778268 / Angielski / Twarda / 2009 / 192 str.
ISBN-13: 9780415778268 / Angielski / Twarda / 2009 / 192 str.
India's national parliamentary elections typically result in the election of majority parliaments and the formation of a single-party majority government. However, India's national party system has changed beyond recognition since the parliamentary elections of 1989. The Congress Party has lost its dominant party status; the number of political parties that contest elections, win seats in parliament and gain cabinet portfolios have increased; minority governments and cabinet instability have become regular features of parliamentary politics. This book addresses each of these aspects of party system transformation in India by applying the analytical techniques of rational and social choice theory. Challenging conventional wisdom, the book argues that the number of parties in India has increased as a result of the unexpected consequences of the constitutional amendment of 1985 that was conceived to curtail party defections. Although the Congress Party no longer dominates the new multi-party system, it still retains a pivotal role in deciding which coalitions may form viable and stable minority government. The Indian case study is theoretically driven and it is readily comparable with other parliamentary federations where minority governments are often formed, such as Canada, and the book finds that these processes are also present in the sub-national party systems of the states, however, with greater variation.
India's national parliamentary elections are conducted under the first-past-the-post electoral system. These typically result in the election of majority parliaments and the formation of a single-party majority government. However, India's election results have been abvery important and puzzling exception none of the general elections held since 1989 produced a majority winner. In most cases, both electoral and parliamentary majorities have been elusive commodities in the world’s most populous established democracy.
This book offers an explanation for the recurrence of hung parliaments and minority governments in India. By providing an account for the puzzle of India’s elusive electoral and parliamentary majorities, the book adds an important case to the literature on the politics of multiparty government. Arguing that a multiparty format may be sustained under the first-past-the-post electoral system in the long-run even if the centrist party is no longer the Condorcet winner in a majority of the constituencies, the book shows that the Indian case provides lessons for the role of the centre in multiparty electoral and parliamentary competition and the political consequences of the first-past-the-post electoral system.