Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence

ISBN-13: 9780367739164 / Angielski / Miękka / 2020 / 110 str.

Keith B. Payne; James Schlesinger

Opis

Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence critically reviews against available evidence the basic assumptions and arguments of "Minimum Deterrence" and finds their claims that the US nuclear force can be safely cut to very low numbers to be demonstrably false and imprudent.

This book was published as a special issue of

Recenzje

"Schlesinger and Payne critically evaluate eight key assumptions underlying the strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence. They conclude that the diplomatic benefits of reducing the United States’ weapons store to the lowest level ‘required’ are outweighed by the risk of attack if the perceived threat of US nuclear retaliation is reduced." - Lanxin Xiang, (2014)

Spis treści

Preface  Executive Summary  I. Introduction: Minimum Deterrence  II. Minimum Deterrence and U.S. Policy  III. Minimum Deterrence: Assumptions, Logic and Conclusions  IV. Examining and Testing the Fundamental Assumptions and Logic of Minimum Deterrence  V. Summary and Conclusion: How Does Minimum Deterrence Fare Against Available Evidence and What Alternative Guidelines May Be Better?  Notes  Appendix

O autorze

Keith B. Payne, Study Director; President, National Institute for Public Policy; Department Head, graduate school of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Washington, DC campus)

The Honorable James Schlesinger, Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Energy; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission