Minds, Causes and Mechanisms

ISBN-13: 9780631218029 / Angielski / Miękka / 2000 / 288 str.

Josep E. Corbi; Josep E. Corba-; Josep L. Prades

Opis

Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms questions the internal consistency of causal physicalism, and vindicates a novel approach to mental causation.

Recenzje

′In their interesting and important book, Corb&í and Prades successfully identify and question the metaphysical assumptions behind current orthodoxy about mental causation, making an original and important contribution to our understanding of this central topic.′

Christopher Hookway, University of Sheffield

′Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms is a timely and highly valuable contribution that will re–energize the ongoing debate and take it to another level. It offers refeshingly lucid and illuminating analysis and critique of the basic assumptions and arguments that have shaped the dominant physicalist outlook in this area, what Corb&í and Prades call "causal physicalism". This book is an essential contribution. Highly recommended.′

Jaegwon Kim, Brown University

′A thorough and subtle critique of physicalism. After reading it, even committed physicalists may conclude that their doctrine is beyond resurrection.′

George Couvalis, Flinders University

Spis treści

Acknowledgements.

Introduction.

1. Physicalism and the Mental: The Dominant View.

2. An Initial Tension: Narrowness and Multiple Realization.

3. Dispositions, Minimality, and Intrinsic Causal Powers.

4. ′Ceteris Paribus′ Laws and the Autonomy of Nonbasic Properties.

5. Strict Laws, Causes, and Background Conditions.

6. Mental Causation.

Notes.

References.

Index.

O autorze

Josep E. Corbi was born in Monover, Spain in 1957. He has been a lecturer at the University of Valencia since 1980, and has published several papers on the philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Josep L. Prades was born in Valencia, Spain in 1954. He taught philosophy at the University of Murcia and is presently a lecturer at the University of Girona. He has published several studies of Wittgenstein′s philosophy and papers on the philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Blurb

Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms questions the internal consistency of causal physicalism, and vindicates a novel approach to mental causation. Through a series of original and detailed arguments, it is made clear that many difficulties in the physicalist picture derive from an implausible view about causality. An alternative approach is defended which shows how mental contents, as opposed to functional properties, may be causally efficacious without having an implementing mechanism.

This volume includes a lucid discussion of recent developments by philosophers such as Block, Davidson, Fodor, Kim, Lewis, Mellor, Putnam, Schiffer, Shoemaker, and Yablo.

No one who wants to deal with the issue of mental causation, or causation in general, will be able to ignore the strong case against physicalism that this book makes.