Preface Introduction Chapter 1: Arguments and Evidence 1.1. Validity and Soundness 1.2. Suppositions and Assertions 1.3. Flaws and Fallacies 1.4. Logical, Epistemic and Rule Circularity 1.5. Annotated further Reading Chapter 2: Conceptual Analysis 2.1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 2.2. Definitions, Analogies and Counterexamples 2.3. The Paradox of Analysis 2.4. Common Sense versus Theoretical Explication 2.5. Annotated further Reading Chapter 3: Analyticity, A Priority and Necessity 3.1. The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction 3.2. Knowledge from the Armchair 3.3. Modalities I: De Re and De Dicto 3.4. Modalities II: Deontic, Epistemic and Metaphysical 3.5. Annotated further Reading Chapter 4: Logic and Language4.1. Semantics and Pragmatics 4.2. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic 4.3. Conditionals 4.4. Probability Theory 4.5. Annotated further Reading Chapter 5: Explanation, Reduction and Causation 5.1. Models of Explanation and Reduction 5.2. From Function to Functionalism 5.3. Supervenience and Multiple Realizability 5.4. The Metaphysics of Causation 5.5. Annotated further Reading Chapter 6: Philosophical Strategies and Dialectics 6.1. Descriptive, Normative and Revisionary Approaches 6.2. Disputes: Verbal, Trivial or Substantive 6.3. Argumentative Heuristics for Theory Construction 6.4. The Method of Reflective Equilibrium 6.5. Annotated further Reading Chapter 7: Intuitions and X-Phi 7.1. The Role of Rational Intuitions in Philosophy 7.2. Thought Experiments and the Method of Cases 7.3. Experimental Philosophy 7.4. Methodological Naturalism and Natural Science 7.5. Annotated further Reading Bibliography
Jesper Kallestrup is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. His main area of research is philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and epistemology.