Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism

ISBN-13: 9783030066482 / Angielski / Miękka / 2018 / 314 str.

Christos Kyriacou; Robin McKenna

Spis treści

Introduction, Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna.- Part I: Epistemic Realism.- 1. The Core Expressivist Manoeuvre, Terence Cuneo.- 2. Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity, Chris Heathwood.- 3. From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points, Christos Kyriacou.- 4. Normative Reasons for Mentalism, Eva Schmidt.- 5. Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate, Nathaniel Sharadin.- Part II: Epistemic Anti-Realism.- 6. Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors about Error Theory, Charles Côté-Bouchard and Clayton Littlejohn.- 7. Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity, Christopher Cowie and Alexander Greenberg.- 8. Correctness and Goodness, Allan Hazlett.- 9. The Genealogy of Relativism and Absolutism, Martin Kusch and Robin McKenna.- 10. Reasons Primitivism and Epistemic Expressivism, Teemu Toppinen.- Part III: Beyond the Realism/Anti-Realism Divide.- 11. What Anti-Realism about Hinges Could Possibly Be, Annalisa Coliva.- 12. Epistemic Schmagency?, A.K. Flowerree.

O autorze

Christos Kyriacou is a Lecturer at the University of Cyprus and has received his PhD in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, UK. His main interests lie in epistemology, metaethics and their intersection. He has published articles in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Papers, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Journal of Philosophical Research, Journal of Value Inquiry, Philosophia as well as in volumes dealing with issues in metaepistemology (Metaepistemology, eds. C.McHugh, J.Way and D.Whiting, forthcoming, co-authored with T.Cuneo) and epistemic normativity (Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, eds. M.Grajner and P.Schmechtig, 2016). He has also written the ‘Metaepistemology’ entry for Oxford Bibliographies Online in Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Robin McKenna is a postdoctoral researcher on the Emergence of Relativism project at the University of Vienna, Austria. Before coming to Vienna, he worked at the University of Geneva. His research is principally in epistemology and philosophy of language, though he has also done work in metaethics and is increasingly interested in the philosophy of science. He is currently working on a book that argues that knowledge is a social status. He has published articles in American Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly  and Synthese.  

Blurb

This book contains twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on metaepistemology, that is, on the nature, existence and authority of epistemic facts. One of the central divides in metaepistemology is between epistemic realists and epistemic anti-realists. Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts (such as the fact that you ought to believe what your evidence supports) exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices. Epistemic anti-realists think that, if epistemic facts exist at all, they are grounded in human judgements and practices, and gain any authority they have from our judgements and practices. This book considers both epistemic realist and anti-realist perspectives, as well as perspectives that “transcend” the realism/anti-realism dichotomy. As such, it constitutes the “state of the art” with regard to metaepistemology, and will shape the debate in years to come.