Meta-Theory of Law

ISBN-13: 9781789450743 / Angielski / Twarda / 2022 / 384 str.

Carpentier

Spis treści

Introduction xiiiMathieu CARPENTIERPart 1 Legal Theory Methods 1Chapter 1 Methodology in Legal Philosophy 3Julie DICKSON1.1 Introduction: methodology in legal philosophy 31.2 The nature of law? 51.3 Changing questions: diversity and development 131.4 Directly evaluative legal philosophy versus indirectly evaluative legal philosophy 191.5 Conclusion 28Chapter 2 The Methodology of Analytic Jurisprudence 31Pierluigi CHIASSONI2.1 Foreword 312.2 The principles of an analytic approach to jurisprudence 322.3 The statute of analytic jurisprudence 382.4 Two sets of analytic tools 412.4.1 Tools for the analysis of legal discourses 422.4.2 Tools for the refinement of extant juridical terminological and conceptual apparatuses 482.4.3 The tools of analytic jurisprudence and conceptual analysis 522.5 Vindicating a modest and reconstructive variety of conceptual analysis 532.6 Vindicating the analytic approach (and the principle of simplicity) against "essentialist" jurisprudence 582.7 References 68Chapter 3 Methodology for Theorizing About the Nature of Law and About Doctrinal Areas of Law 75Brian H BIX3.1 Introduction 753.2 Theories of the nature of law 753.2.1 Increasing philosophical sophistication 763.2.2 Hans Kelsen 773.2.3 H.L.A Hart 783.2.4 Ronald Dworkin 793.2.5 Joseph Raz 803.2.6 John Finnis 813.2.7 Frederick Schauer 813.2.8 Brian Leiter 823.2.9 Mark Greenberg 833.3 Theories of doctrinal areas 833.3.1 Descriptive, prescriptive and neutral 843.3.2 Purposes 853.3.3 Universal versus parochial 853.3.4 The subject of explanation (the data) 863.3.5 Justice and autonomy or efficiency 863.4 Conclusion 873.5 References 87Chapter 4 Empirical Complexity as a Conceptual Claim: Reappraising Hart's Account of Law as a Complex Social Practice 93Gregory BLIGH4.1 Introduction 934.1.1 No place for empirical science in Hartian jurisprudence 944.1.2 Hart's object: "characterizing" the "complexity" of the legal system 964.1.3 Two key sources of influence: J.L Austin and P.F Strawson 994.1.4 Do the (linguistic) twist 1014.2 Hart's Austinian account of the quotidian empirical statement 1064.2.1 A critique of reductive sense-data empiricism 1064.2.2 Accounting for the complexity of experience 1124.3 Rejecting the descriptive fallacy 1154.3.1 A critique of Russell's theory of meaning 1164.3.2 A rejection of the descriptive fallacy carried over into Hart's jurisprudence 1224.4 The empirical relevance of the conceptual scheme in The Concept of Law 1264.4.1 "Descriptive metaphysics" and "linguistic phenomenology" 1274.4.2 Empirical complexity and presupposition in The Concept of Law 1354.5 Conclusion 1404.6 References 142Chapter 5 Authoritative Disagreement: Meta-Legal Theory and the Semantics of Adjudication 149Andrej KRISTAN and Giulia PRAVATO5.1 Introduction 1495.2 Explananda 1505.2.1 Authoritative disagreement in fact-oriented interpretation 1505.2.2 Authoritative disagreement in text-oriented interpretation 1515.3 Meta-theoretic demarcation 1545.3.1 Rule-skeptical legal positivism 1555.3.2 Conventionalist legal positivism 1555.3.3 Interpretivist legal antipositivism 1565.4 Semantic explanations 1575.4.1 Semantic invariantism 1585.4.2 Expressivism 1595.4.3 Indexical contextualism 1615.4.4 Non-indexical contextualism 1645.4.5 Dialetheism 1645.4.6 Content relativism 1655.4.7 Assessment relativism 1665.4.8 Truth-value indeterminism 1685.5 Conclusion 1695.6 References 170Chapter 6 Jeremy Waldron, the Legitimacy of Judicial Review and Political Political Theory 179Charles-Maxime PANACCIO6.1 Introduction 1796.2 The first Waldron 1806.2.1 The circumstances of politics 1806.2.2 Political political theory 1816.2.3 Rights 1826.2.4 CRJR 1826.3 Reviews of the first Waldron 1846.3.1 The nature of disagreement 1846.3.2 Substance and results versus process and procedure 1856.3.3 CRJR 1876.4 The second Waldron 1876.5 Conclusion 1916.6 References 192Part 2 Legal Science Theories 195Chapter 7 Metatheory of an (Empirical) Legal Science 197Eric MILLARD7.1 General framework: theory, metatheory and metascience 1977.1.1 Theory and metatheory 1977.1.2 A theory of legal science as a metascience 2007.1.3 A theory of (empirical) legal science 2017.1.4 A theory of (empirical legal) science as applied metatheory 2057.2 (Meta)theoretical theses of an (empirical) legal science 2067.2.1 Epistemological thesis 2087.2.2 Meta-ethical thesis 2097.2.3 Methodological thesis 212Chapter 8 Legal and Social Sciences: What are the Links? 215Véronique CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS8.1 Social sciences, a factor in redefining legal sciences 2188.1.1 Epistemological movements: the positioning of legal sciences between exact, physical and natural sciences and social sciences 2188.1.2 Heuristic movements: the reinvigoration of legal sciences by the social sciences 2218.2 The modalities of disciplinary articulations 2258.2.1 Difficulties and pitfalls 2258.2.2 Interdisciplinary experiences and the pragmatism of interweaving knowledge 2288.3 References 231Chapter 9 A Hermeneutic Reading of Law and Legal Theory: Regarding Paul Ricoeur 235Xavier BIOY and Thomas ESCACH-DUBOURG9.1 The outcome of a long journey, from the interpretive method to a general epistemology 2379.1.1 A philosophy of interpretation 2379.1.2 A hermeneutic of symbols as a propaedeutic of a grand philosophy: the symbol suggests 2439.2 Hermeneutic and textual disciplines 2479.2.1 The conceptual break brought about by textual hermeneutics: the paradigm of textuality 2489.2.2 The methodological break brought about by textual hermeneutics: reading and textual interpretation 2539.3 Law as a hermeneutical discipline 2579.3.1 Interpretation of the law: quoting the law and understanding it are one and the same thing 2579.3.2 Interpretation by law and interpretation in law 260Chapter 10 Legal Science According to the Pure Theory of Law 265Thomas HOCHMANN10.1 The negation of legal science (Sander) 26710.2 The defense of legal science (Merkl) 27010.3 Legal science pushed into the background (Kelsen) 27610.3.1 Absence of denial of legal science 27710.3.2 A theory of law, not of legal science 27810.3.3 An interest in decision, not knowledge 27910.3.4 A regression: the theory of the tacit alternative clause 281Chapter 11 Axiological Neutrality, Oppositional Thinking and Knowledge 285Jean-Baptiste POINTEL11.1 The three aspects of a theory 28511.1.1 Pascal's wager, a textbook case 28611.1.2 A scientific theory of law 28811.1.3 A factual analysis of "ought to be" 28911.2 "Hume's Guillotine", a false foundation for axiological neutrality 29011.2.1 The definition of "Hume's Guillotine", an error of interpretation 29011.2.2 The meaning of "Hume's Guillotine", explaining its motivations 29111.2.3 The consequence of "Hume's Guillotine", a return to argument 29211.2.4 Purity or axiological neutrality, a return to Max Weber 29311.2.5 Language acts in John L Austin, the inevitable fusion between descriptive and prescriptive 29411.2.6 Platonic reductionism, a problematological repression 29511.2.7 The importance of the implicit, a more scientific approach 29611.3 Oppositional commitment to the theory 29811.3.1 The critical eye, connecting analysis to policy 29811.3.2 Scientific purity, a political program 29911.3.3 Methodological anarchism, a basis for research 30011.3.4 The archaeology of knowledge, a critical method 30211.3.5 Example: the concept of state tyranny 30311.3.6 Oppositional knowledge in law, a program to be defined 30411.4 A new disciplinary ethics, but for which academic field? 30511.5 References 306Chapter 12 Legal Science and Its Roles in Legal Reasoning 311Fábio Perin SHECAIRA12.1 The concept of a source of law 31112.1.1 Explicit reference in legal practice 31212.1.2 Prescriptions that serve as content-independent reasons 31312.2 Arguments from authority 31412.3 Types of scholarly authority 31612.3.1 Describing and prescribing 31612.3.2 Can legal science really serve as practical authority? 31912.3.3 A note on legitimate and de facto authority 32312.4 Implications for jurisprudence 32412.5 Conclusion 32712.6 References 327Chapter 13 Inference to the Best Explanation in Legal Science; on Balancing Contrastive Hypotheses 329David DUARTE13.1 Normative propositions in legal science 32913.2 Inference to the best explanation 33713.3 Speculative (hypothetical) normative propositions and inference to the best explanation 34313.4 Contrastive hypotheses in balancing 34613.5 References 353List of Authors 359Index 361

O autorze

Mathieu Carpentier is Professor of Public Law at the University of Toulouse and the Director of the Institut Maurice Hauriou in France. His research focuses mainly on legal philosophy and constitutional law.