Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics

ISBN-13: 9789401185448 / Angielski / Miękka / 1969 / 252 str.

H. J. Maccloskey

Opis

The purpose of this work is to develop a general theory of ethics which ex plains the logical status of moral judgments and the nature of the general principles which we should adopt and on the basis of which we should act. The enquiry into the logical function of moral judgments is entered into as important in its own right and as a preliminary to the normative enquiry, for it is on the basis of our conclusions in the area of meta-ethics, that we de termine the appropriate method of reaching our normative ethic. The ap proach followed in the meta-ethical enquiry is that of examining theories of the past and present with a view to seeing why and in what respects they fail, in particular, what features of moral discourse are not adequately explained or accommodated by them. A positive theory which seeks to take full account of these and all other logical features of moral discourse is then developed in terms of a modified intuitionism of the kind outlined by W. D. Ross, 'good' being explained as the name of a consequential property, 'right' in terms of moral suitability, and moral obligations as consisting in our being constrained to act in certain ways by facts we apprehend to constitute moral reasons which constrain us so to act."

Spis treści

1. Introductory: Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics and Morality.- 1. Levels of Theorizing.- 2. Meta-Ethics.- 3. Normative Ethics and Morality.- 4. Inter-relations between Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics.- 5. The plan of this work.- A. Meta-Ethics: A Defence of an Intuitionist Ethic.- 2. Theistic and Naturalistic Meta-Ethical Theories.- 1. Theistic Ethics: God as Creator of Morality.- 2. Thomistic Natural Law Ethics.- 3. Naturalistic Theories.- The Naturalistic Fallacy.- Approval Theories.- (a) What is an attitude?.- (b) What is it to approve?.- (c) “Good” means “I approve”.- (d) Relativism as a meta-ethic: ‘Good’ means’ society approves’.- (e) ‘Good’ means ‘approved by the impartial observer’.- 3. Non-Cognitivist Meta-Ethical Theories.- 1. ‘Good’ as expressing feelings and attitudes.- 2. ‘Ought’ as expressing and commanding.- 3. Stevenson: ‘Good’ means ‘I approve; do so as well’.- 4. Hare’s Ethical Subjectivist Prescriptivism.- 5. Nowell-Smith’s Ethics.- 4. A Positive Approach: Intuitionism and the Nature of the Objective Moral Facts.- 1. The Factual Character of Moral Discourse.- 2. Moral Principles: Their Synthetic A Priori Character.- 3. Moral Perplexity: Deliberation and Reasoning.- 4. Moral Advice.- 5. Teaching and Learning Moral Concepts and Truths.- 6. Similarities and Differences Between ‘Good’, ‘Right’, ‘Ought’, and ‘Duty’.- 7. The Accounts Suggested by These Logical Features of Moral Expressions.- (a) ‘Good’ as the name of a property.- (b) ‘Right’ as the name of a relation.- (c) ‘Ought’ and Reasons for acting.- 5. Intuitionism: How we Come to Gain Moral Knowledge.- 1. Intuitive Insight as Rational Apprehension of Necessary Truths: The Powers of Reason.- 2. Synthetic a priori propositions.- 3. Truth Tests and Intuitive Insights.- 4. Intuitionism and Tolerance.- 5. Multiple Intuitions.- 6. Summary of Conclusions.- Note A. Meta-Theories of Rights.- Note B. Concerning Revisionary Meta-Ethics.- B. Normative Ethics: The Case for Ethical Pluralism.- Introducing Part B. from Meta-Ethics to Normative Ethics.- 6. Intrinsic Goods.- 1. Pleasure and Happiness.- 2. Knowledge.- 3. Rationality and Rational Belief.- 4. Beauty and Aesthetic Excellence.- 5. Moral Goodness.- 6. Self-perfection.- 7: Monistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Utilitarianism.- 1. Varieties of Utilitarianism.- (a) Radical and Conservative Utilitarianism.- (b) Hedonistic, Eudemonistic, and Ideal Utilitarianism.- (c) Act and Rule Utilitarianism.- 2. Act Utilitarianism.- 3. Rule Utilitarianism.- 8. Pluralistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Kant and Natural Law.- 1. The Kantian Theory.- (a) Formula 1.- (b) Formula 2.- 2. Thomistic Natural Law Ethics.- 9. A Positive Approach: Prima Facie Duties.- 1. Presumptions in Favour of a Theory of Prima Facie Duties.- 2. The Nature of Prima Facie Duties.- (a) Promotion of Good, Elimination of Evil.- (b) Justice.- (c) Respect for persons.- (d) Honesty.- 3. Interconnexions between prima facie duties.- 4. The Prima Facie Character of Prima Facie Obligations.- 5. Prima Facie Ought and ‘Can’.