Manipulating Political Decentralisation: Africa's Inclusive Autocrats

ISBN-13: 9781138203037 / Angielski / Twarda / 2017 / 176 str.

Lovise Aalen; Ragnhild L. Muriaas

Opis

Can autocrats establish representative subnational governments? And which strategies of manipulation are available if they would like to reduce the uncertainty caused by introducing political decentralisation?　 In the wake of local government reforms, several states across the world have introduced legislation that provides for subnational elections. This does not mean that representative subnational governments in these countries are all of a certain standard. Political decentralisation should not be confused with democratisation, as the process is likely to be manipulated in ways that do not produce meaningful avenues for political participation and contestation locally.　 Using examples from Africa, Lovise Aalen and Ragnhild L. Muriaas propose five requirements for representative subnational governments and four strategies that national governments might use to manipulate the outcome of political decentralisation. The case studies of Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa and Uganda illustrate why autocrats sometimes are more open to competition at the subnational level than democrats. Manipulating Political Decentralisation provides a new conceptual tool to assess representative subnational governments' quality, aiding us in building theories on the consequences of political decentralisation on democratisation.

Spis treści

Series Editors’ Foreword  1. Introduction  1.1 Elections in authoritarian regimes  1.2 Extending elections to the subnational level  1.3 The argument of the book  1.4 Conceptualisation and methods  1.5 Outline of the book  2. Four Strategies of Manipulation  2.1 Advocating for decentralisation after the Cold War  2.2 How decentralisation failed to deliver  2.3 Why some governments decentralise  2.4 Strategies for Manipulating Political Decentralisation  2.5 Possibilities for contestation and participation  2.6 Conclusions  3. The Requirements of Political Decentralisation  3.1 Unpacking the relationship between regime type and decentralisation  3.2 Elections as hallmarks of political decentralisation  3.3 Requirements for representative subnational governments  3.4 The Four Ways of Manipulating Political Decentralisation  3.5 Case selection  3.6 Conclusions  4. Decentralisation through dominance in Ethiopia  4.1 Ethiopia under EPRDF: Decentralisation and autocratisation side by side  4.2 The requirements of representative subnational governments and their challenges  4.3 Manipulating political decentralisation through dominance  4.4 No contestation but mass-participation  4.5 Conclusions  5. Institutional interruption in Malawi  5.1 Regime and stalled political decentralisation  5.2 The requirements of representative subnational governments  5.3 Identifying Manipulation Strategies  5.4 Opportunities for Contestation and Participation  5.5 Conclusion  6. Overwhelming the opposition in Uganda  6.1 The decentralising autocrat  6.2 The requirements of representative subnational governments  6.3 Identifying Manipulation Strategies  6.4 Opportunities for Contestation and Participation  6.5 Conclusion  7. Regionalised opposition in South Africa  7.1 Democracy and the dominant position of ANC  7.2 The requirements for representative subnational governments  7.3 Manipulating Political Decentralisation  7.4 Consequences for contestation and participation  7.5 Conclusion  8. Conclusions  8.1 The five requirements of representative SNGs  8.2 Manipulation strategies and the space for contestation and participation  8.3 Extension to other cases  8.4 The challenges of measuring and comparing local government  8.5 Inclusive autocrats  8.6 The way forward