International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements: A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union

ISBN-13: 9781107677265 / Angielski / Miękka / 2017 / 252 str.

Clifford J. Carrubba; Matthew J. Gabel

Opis

A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.

Recenzje

'Through formal modeling, or game-theory, the book offers a fascinating portrayal of the dynamics that govern judicial adjudication vis à vis market integration in the European Union. The methodological rigor that characterizes the work - in particular the consistent search for alternative explanations - supports the validity of the theory and stimulates further reflection on its practical implications … The complexity of the topic and the innovative approach followed by the authors make this volume a valuable learning instrument for graduate students of political sciences and law, in particular Ph.D. candidates working with regressive analysis, but also for judges and lawyers interested in the enforcement of international agreements.' Giacomo Di Federico, International Journal for Court Administration

Spis treści

1. Introduction: international courts and compliance; 2. A theory of courts and compliance in international law; 3. The empirical relevance of the theoretical model: evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union context; 4. Preliminary considerations on testing the political-sensitivity hypothesis: designing a control for the legal merits; 5. A test of the political-sensitivity hypothesis; 6. A test of the conditional-effectiveness hypothesis: the European Court of Justice and economic integration; 7. Conclusion.