Intelligence Failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby's Role in the United Nations Command's Defeat in November, 1950

ISBN-13: 9781503122970 / Angielski / Miękka / 2014 / 140 str.

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Coll

Opis

In November, 1950, the United States Army suffered one of its most devastating defeats ever, in the frozen mountains of North Korea at the hands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This defeat fundamentally changed the nature of the Korean War. It was, however, avoidable. This Chinese victory was partially the result of one of the most glaring failures in U.S. military intelligence history. The officer most responsible for this failure was the Far East Command Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2), Major General Charles Andrew Willoughby. His inaccurate intelligence picture contributed to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's flawed understanding of the nature of the Chinese Communist intent.

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