'While inconsistencies have traditionally been regarded as fatal glitches that needed to be eliminated from theories and descriptions, Kertész and Rákosi demonstrate that although consistency remains a fundamental desideratum, there are inconsistencies that are tolerable and that the emergence and resolution of inconsistencies are a natural part of linguistic argumentation. The authors' model throws new light on the nature of linguistic theorizing by offering a unified framework that integrates inconsistencies whether arising between data of a particular kind, or between different kinds of data, or different theories, or different descriptions.' Edith A. Moravcsik, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
1. Introduction: the Main Problem (P); Part I. The State of the Art: 2. Approaches to inconsistency in the philosophy of science; 3. Approaches to inconsistency in linguistic theorising; Part II. Paraconsistency: 4. The paraconsistent treatment of inconsistency; 5. Prospects and limits of the paraconsistent treatment of inconsistency; Part III. Plausible Argumentation: 6. From paraconsistency to plausible argumentation; 7. Inconsistency and theory change; 8. The treatment of inconsistency in Optimality Theory; 9. The heuristics of inconsistency resolution; Part IV. Summary: 10. The methodological background; 11. Conclusions.