Hume on the Self and Personal Identity

ISBN-13: 9783031042775 / Angielski / Miękka / 2023

Opis

This book brings together a team of international scholars to attempt to understand David Hume’s conception of the self. The standard interpretation is that he holds a no-self view: we are just bundles of conscious experiences, thoughts and emotions. There is nothing deeper to us, no core, no essence, no soul. In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, though, Hume admits to being dissatisfied with such an account and Part One of this book explores why this might be so. Part Two turns to Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise, where Hume moves away from the ‘fiction’ of a simple self, to the complex idea we have of our flesh and blood selves, those with emotional lives, practical goals, and social relations with others. In Part Three connections are traced between Hume and Madhyamaka Buddhism, Husserl and the phenomenological tradition, and contemporary cognitive science.

Spis treści

Part 1: I The Self in Treatise Book 1.- 1. Andrew Ward, How Sceptical Is Hume’s Account of Personal Identity?’.- 2. Don Ainslie,Does Hume Have a “Bundling Problem"?.- 3.Galen Strawson,There is No Question in Philosophy More Abstruse: Hume On Personal Identity’.- 4. Josef Moural, ‘Hume and Kames on the Self and Personal Identity’.- Part 2: Character, Sympathy and Self.- 5. Ruth Boeker,‘Character Development in Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s Approaches to Self’.- 6. Dan O’Brien, Hume and the Epistemic Roles of the Self.- 7. Louise Braddock, Scottish Sympathy: Hume, Smith and Psychoanalysis.- Part 3 Self, Narrative and Action.- 8. Anik Waldow, Hume on Self-Determination.- 9. Lorenzo Greco, A Fragmented Unity: Hume On Narrative Identity and Temporality.- 10. Constantine Sandis, Hume on Characteristic Selves and Moral Responsibility.- Part 4 No-Self Views and Cognitive Science.- 11. Jay Garfield, Candrakīrti and Hume on the Self and the Person’.- 12. Mark Collier,Hume and Cognitive Science on the Natural Belief in Persistent Selves

O autorze

Dan O’Brien is Reader in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University, UK, and founder and organizer of the Oxford Hume Forum. He has published on Hume, philosophy of mind, epistemology, teleology, gardening, Caravaggio and cubism; his books have been translated into Korean, Portuguese and Arabic (forthcoming).

Blurb

This book brings together a team of international scholars to attempt to understand David Hume’s conception of the self. The standard interpretation is that he holds a no-self view: we are just bundles of conscious experiences, thoughts and emotions. There is nothing deeper to us, no core, no essence, no soul. In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, though, Hume admits to being dissatisfied with such an account and Part One of this book explores why this might be so. Part Two turns to Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise, where Hume moves away from the ‘fiction’ of a simple self, to the complex idea we have of our flesh and blood selves, those with emotional lives, practical goals, and social relations with others. In Part Three connections are traced between Hume and Madhyamaka Buddhism, Husserl and the phenomenological tradition, and contemporary cognitive science.

Dan O’Brien is Reader in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University, UK, and founder and organizer of the Oxford Hume Forum. He has published on Hume, philosophy of mind, epistemology, teleology, gardening, Caravaggio and cubism; his books have been translated into Korean, Portuguese and Arabic (forthcoming).