ISBN-13: 9783639122732 / Angielski / Miękka / 2009 / 92 str.
Jalisco's corn producers from the Cienega province are locked in a cycle of low profitability. The corn producers have been affected by the lack of access to adequate financial intermediaries such as banks. The cycle of low profitability contributes towards a low quality of life and a lack of competitiveness. Hence, farmers have not been able to adjust to the fierce competition from the US producers. A lack of trustworthy collateral is a major problem in order to get access to credits. The grain receipts system (GRS) provides a method of collateralizing crops for access to credits. With the GRS the risk is not intended to be eliminated; instead it is a mechanism where the risk is shared between the corn producers, elevators and banks which are the subject of analysis in this study using the agency theory.
Jaliscos corn producers from the Cienega province are locked in a cycle of low profitability. The corn producers have been affected by the lack of access to adequate financial intermediaries such as banks. The cycle of low profitability contributes towards a low quality of life and a lack of competitiveness. Hence, farmers have not been able to adjust to the fierce competition from the US producers. A lack of trustworthy collateral is a major problem in order to get access to credits. The grain receipts system (GRS) provides a method of collateralizing crops for access to credits. With the GRS the risk is not intended to be eliminated; instead it is a mechanism where the risk is shared between the corn producers, elevators and banks which are the subject of analysis in this study using the agency theory.