Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America

ISBN-13: 9780190868895 / Angielski / Twarda / 2018 / 286 str.

Javier Corrales

Opis

In a comprehensive reviews of constitutional change in Latin America, Fixing Democracy argues that the strongest predictor of whether a new constitution will expand or restrict presidential powers is power asymmetry, or more specifically, the distance between Incumbent and Opposition forces at the negotiating table.

Recenzje

This book is an important contribution to the field of neo-institutionalism in comparative politics. It fills a gap in knowledge of the reasons why presidential powers expand or contract in the context of the broader strength of democracy.

O autorze

Javier Corrales is Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor of Political Science at Amherst College and obtained his PhD in Government from Harvard University in 1996. He specializes in comparative politics and international relations of Latin America. He has written extensively on economic reforms, democratization, presidential powers, term limits, education policy and international relations. He has been a Fulbright scholar in Bogotá, Colombia, and Caracas, Venezuela. He is on the editorial board of Latin American Politics and Society and Americas Quarterly, and the European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies.