Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge

ISBN-13: 9780198801771 / Angielski / Twarda / 2018 / 224 str.

Jessica Brown

Opis

Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.

Recenzje

Epistemologists will get a great deal out of engaging with this book. It's clearly written, and it offers a number of interesting and persuasive arguments on a range of topics at the centre of contemporary epistemology, in particular the relations between knowledge, justification, evidence, and action, scepticism and the epistemology of defeat. Anyone interested in these issues - so anyone interested in the core concerns of contemporary analytic epistemology - will find engaging with Brown's timely and welcome contribution rewarding.

O autorze

Jessica Brown is professor of philosophy in the Arché research centre at St Andrews University. Since her Ph.D. at Oxford University, she has worked on a wide range of topics within philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the methodology of philosophy. She has published a monograph) on self-knowledge (Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, MIT 2004), and has co-edited two volumes for Oxford University Press (Knowledge Ascriptions, 2012; Assertion, 2011). Since her appointment in St Andrews in 2007, she has helped to lead the highly successful international philosophical research centre Arché. She was principal investigator on a major AHRC-funded project (2008-12) examining the methodological foundations of philosophical enquiry. Since 2013, she has been the editor of Philosophical Quarterly.