Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

ISBN-13: 9783642358210 / Angielski / Miękka / 2013 / 168 str.

Demet Cetiner

Opis

​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Recenzje

From the book reviews:

"The book has nine chapters. ... the book is well-written, self-contained, and would be of interest to academics working in this area. ... it brings together the theoretical (centralized) allocation approach with the heuristics for the decentralized case ... ." (Arne K. Strauss, Interfaces, Vol. 44 (5), September-October, 2014)

Spis treści

Introduction.- Selected Topics in Revenue Management.- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances.- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory.- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game.- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances.- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances.- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices.- Conclusion and Future Research.- Appendix: Computational Study.

O autorze

Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.