Economic Models of Trade Unions

ISBN-13: 9789401050494 / Angielski / Miękka / 2012 / 326 str.

P. Garonna; P. Mori; P. Tedeschi

Opis

Over the 1980s unions have lost about 5 million members in OECD countries. The proportion of unionized workers is increasing in the services, public sector and among women. Today, almost two out of five union members are employed in the public sector. Wide differences remain in the levels of unionization in diverse countries, while in the United States, France and Spain union members account now for little more than 10% of the labour force, in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) the corre'sponding figure is between 75 and 85%. In general, rates have been higher in Europe than in North America. Economic analysis is paying increasing attention to these developments and to their policy implications (Edwards, Caronna and Todling, OCDE 1991). Recent progress in economic theory has enabled some light to be cast on the determinants of unionism, on the other hand, efforts aimed at coming to grips with the economic reality of unions have significantly contributed to theoretical advancement by extending and modifying conventional microeconomic wisdom. The reader of this volume will judge whether the insight gained is sufficient, or - as a recent survey concluded ~ the problem has proved to be virtually intractable (Johnson, p. 24). These can be grouped under three headings, corresponding to the three parts of the volume, which will be illustrated in the Introduction.

Recenzje

`... a fine collection of models on trade unions' behaviour and on the related empirical literature.'
Economic Notes

Spis treści

One: Unions as Organizations.- 1. The microeconomic theory of the trade union.- 1.1 Foundations.- 1.2 Trade unions in the literature.- 1.3 A model of a utilitarian trade union.- 1.4 On extensions and problems.- 1.5 Conclusion.- References.- 2. Labour union objectives and collective bargaining.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The specification of union goals.- 2.3 The union’s majority preference relation.- 2.4 Are the union’s preferences cardinal?.- 2.5 Union—firm bargaining solutions.- References.- 3. Union wages, temporary lay-offs, and seniority.- 3.1 A model of a unionized sector under seniority rule.- 3.2 Steady-state comparisons.- 3.3 The effect of the seniority rule for lay-offs.- 3.4 Concluding remarks.- References.- 4. The determination of the union status of workers.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 A model of union status determination.- 4.3 The data and econometric framework.- 4.4 Estimation.- 4.5 Analysis of results.- 4.6 Summary and conclusions.- References.- Two: Union-Employer Relations.- 5. Wage bargaining and employment.- 5.1 A simple monopoly union.- 5.2 Efficient bargains.- 5.3 The union as a commune: A digression.- 5.4 Some simple conventions.- 5.5 Formal bargaining theory.- 5.6 Sales constraints and incremental bargaining.- 5.7 Conclusion.- References.- 6. Longitudinal analyses of the effects of trade unions.- 6.1 Longitudinal models of what unions do.- 6.2 The problem of measurement error.- 6.3 Comparisons of longitudinal and cross-section estimates of union effects.- 6.4 Bounding the true impact?.- 6.5 Conclusion.- References.- 7. Trade unions and optimal labour contracts.- 7.1 Competitive equilibria.- 7.2 Optimal labour contracts and a union without internal risk-sharing.- 7.3 Efficient bargaining.- 7.4 Summary and concluding remarks.- References.- 8. Testing the efficiency of employment contracts.- 8.1 Introduction.- 8.2 Some evidence from experimental data.- 8.3 A framework for inference.- 8.4 Empirical implementation.- 8.5 Concluding remarks.- References.- Appendix A: Definitions and sources for variables used In the empirical analysis.- Appendix B: Problems of empirical implementation.- 9. Bargaining and strikes.- 9.1 Introduction.- 9.2 A model with limited delay between offers.- 9.3 A model with decay.- 9.4 Concluding remarks.- Referenees.- 10. An investigation into the determinants of U.S. strike activity.- 10.1 Construction of the data and variables.- 10.2 Empirical specification and results.- 10.3 Summary of the findings.- References.- Three: Unions and Macroeconomic Performance.- 11. Hysterisis in unemployment.- 11.1 Introduction.- 11.2 The derived demand for labour.- 11.3 Wage setting in a pure insider model.- 11.4 Wage setting with some pressure from outsiders.- 11.5 Unemployment duration and the wage setting process.- 11.6 Conclusion.- References.- 12. Long-term unemployment and macroeconomic policy.- 12.1 Transmission of macroeconomic policies to the labour market.- 12.2 The labour market.- 12.3 Persistence of policy effects in the labour market.- 12.4 Concluding remarks.- References.- 13. Maeroeconomic stabilization policy and trade union behaviour as a repeated game.- 13.1 Introduction.- 13.2 Government intervention and union behaviour in a single-state game.- 13.3 Non-co-operative equilibrium in a multi-stage game.- 13.4 Conclusion.- References.- 14. The rise in unemployment: A multi-country study.- 14.1 Introduction.- 14.2 A theoretical framework for analysis.- 14.3 Empirical results.- 14.4 Accounting for the rise in unemployment.- 14.5 The role of institutions: A comparative assessment.- Concluding remarks.- References.- Appendix: Data sources.- 15. The regulation of inflation and unemployment.- 15.1 Wage price stability and the theory of public goods.- 15.2 The impact of a centralized system of industrial relations.- 15.3 Public good or private interest?.- 15.4 An Index of neocorporatism.- 15.5 Empirical verification.- 15.6 Concluding remarks.- References.- Author index.