Economic Analysis of Contract Law: Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

ISBN-13: 9783319879871 / Angielski / Miękka / 2019 / 203 str.

Sugata Bag

Spis treści

1. Introduction

2. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract

3. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

4. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

5. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information –A Mechanism Design Approach

6. Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

7. Concluding Notes

O autorze

Sugata Bag is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, India. After earning his B.Sc. (Honours) Economics from Calcutta University , Professor Bag completed Masters and Doctoral work in Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research interest lies in the following domain-  Law and Economics,  Development Economics,  Contract Theory,  Applied Econometrics.