Dynamic Oligopolies with Time Delays

ISBN-13: 9789811317859 / Angielski / Twarda / 2018 / 266 str.

Akio Matsumoto; Ferenc Szidarovszky

Opis

This is the first book to comprehensively examine the asymptotic behavior of dynamic monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies where firms face information and implementation delays.

Spis treści

Preface.- 1. Introduction.- 2.Dynamic Monopolies.- 2.1. Discrete time models.- 2.2. Continuous time models with fixed delays.- 2.3. Continuous time models with distributed delays.- 2.4. Supplementary notes and discussions.- 3.Dynamic Duopolies.- 3.1. Discrete time model.- 3.2. Continuous time models with fixed delays.- 3.3. Continuous time models with distributed delays.- 3.4. Supplementary notes and discussions.- 4.Dynamic Oligopolies.- 4.1. Discrete dynamics.- 4.2. Continuous dynamics with fixed delays.- 4.3. Continuous dynamics with distributed delays.- 4.4. Supplementary notes and discussions.- 5.Learning in Monopolies and Oligopolies.- 5.1. Learning in monopolies.- 5.2. Learning in oligopolies.- 6. Oligopolies with Partial Cooperation.- 6.1. Dynamic models.- 6.2. Cartelizing groups and antitrust threshold.- 6.3. Supplementary notes and discussions Appendix A. Stability Switching Curves with Fixed Delays.- A.1. Single-delay equations.- A.2. Two-delay equations.- A.3. Three-delay equationsAppendix.- B. Stability Analysis with Continuously Distributed DelaysAppendix.- C. Comparison of Discrete and Continuous Dynamics.

O autorze

Akio Matsumoto, Chuo University

Ferenc Szidarovszky, Corvinus University

Blurb

This is the first book to comprehensively examine the asymptotic behavior of dynamic monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies where firms face information and implementation delays. It considers discrete and continuous timescales, continuously distributed delays, as well as single and multiple delays. It also discusses models with linear and hyperbolic price functions in three types of oligopolies: Cournot competition with quantity-adjusting firms, Bertrand competition with price-adjusting firms, and mixed oligopolies with both types of firms. In addition to the traditional Cournot-Nash equilibria, it introduces cases of partial cooperation are also introduced, leading to the analysis of cartelizing groups of firms and possible governmental actions against antitrust behavior. Further, the book investigates special processes for firms learning about the uncertain price function based on repeated market information. It addresses asymptotic properties of the associated dynamic systems, derives stability conditions, identifies stability switching curves, and presents in global analyses of cases of instability. The book includes both theoretical results and computer studies to illustrate and verify the theoretical findings.