1. The Battle for Free Will.- 1.1 Fatalism and Determinism.- 1.2 Logical Fatalism.- 1.2.1 Bivalence.- 1.2.2 Necessity of the past.- 1.2.3 Truth and free will.- 1.3 How to avoid the battle.- 1.4 From logical fatalism to theological fatalism.- 2. Metaphysics and Logic of Time.- 2.1 Ontology of time.- 2.2 Dynamics of time: A and B-theory.- 2.3 Dynamics and Ontology.- 2.4 Intermezzo: Persistence and Scientific Image of the World.- 2.5 Topology of Time: Closed and open universe.- 2.6 Temporal logic.- 2.6.1 Linear time.- 2.6.2 Branching time.- 2.6.3 Peircean Semantics.- 2.6.4 Thin Red Line Model.- 3. Extreme Measures.- 3.1 Open Theism.- 3.1.1 A Different Concept of God.- 3.1.2 The Openness of the Future.- 3.1.3 To What Openness is the Open Theist Committed?.- 3.1.4 Theological Difficulties.- 3.1.5 Conclusions on Open Theism.- 3.2 Theological Determinism.- 3.2.1 Non Theological Compatibilism.- 3.2.2 Theological Compatibilism.- 4. God Knows the True Future: Ockhamism.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 The Ochkamist Solution.- 4.3 The True Future.- 4.4 Soft Facts.- 4.5 Metaphysics of Time and Ockhamism.- 4.5.1 Presentism and Truth.- 4.5.2 TSB Revisited.- 4.5.3 Eternalist Ockhamism.- 4.5.4 Presentist Ockhamism?.- 4.5.5 Growing Block and Spotlight Ockhamism.- 4.6 Conclusion: Is There Really an Ockham's Way Out?.- 5. Molinism.- 5.1 Conditions of freedom.- 5.2 The Structure of the Molinist World.- 5.2.1 Local TRL.- 5.2.2 Many Worlds and Normal TRL.- 5.2.3 What Answer to the Fatalist Argument?.- 5.2.4 CFs as Counterfactuals?.- 5.3 The Costs of Molinism.- 5.3.1 The Truth-Making Principle.- 5.3.2 Liberalizing TSB.- 5.4 The Costs that the Molinist does not Have to Pay.- 5.4.1 Adams' and Hasker's Arguments.- 5.4.2 What does not work in Adams' and Hasker's Arguments.- 5.4.3 Adams' argument.- 5.4.4 Hasker's argument.- 5.5 Conclusion.- 6. The Timeless Solution.- 6.1 How the Timeless Solution Works.- 6.2 Some Objections.- 6.3 Timeless God and Eternalism.- 6.4 A-Theory and Timeless God.- 6.4.1 The Semantic Debate.- 6.4.2 Assessing the Semantic Debate.- 6.4.3 The Metaphysics Debate.- 6.5 Fragmentalism and Timeless God.- 6.5.1 Perspectival Semantics.- 6.5.2 Perspectival Semantics and Eternalism.- 6.5.3 Fragmentalism.- 6.5.4 God's Knowledge and Fragmentalism.- 6.6 Conclusion.
Ciro De Florio is Senior Researcher in Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Department of Philosophy, Catholic University of Milan, Italy
Aldo Frigerio is Associate Professor in Philosophy of Language at the Department of Philosophy, Catholic University of Milan, Italy
This book deals with an old conundrum: if God knows what we will choose tomorrow, how can we be free to choose otherwise? If all our choices are already written, is our freedom simply an illusion? This book provides a precise analysis of this dilemma using the tools of modern ontology and the logic of time. With a focus on three intertwined concepts - God’s nature, the formal structure of time, and the metaphysics time, including the relationship between temporal entities and a timeless God - the chapters analyse various solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom, revealing the advantages and drawbacks of each. Building on this analysis, the authors advance constructive solutions, showing under what conditions an entity can be omniscient in the presence of free agents, and whether an eternal entity can know the tensed futures of the world. The metaphysics of time, its topology and the semantics of future tensed sentences are shown to be invaluable topics in dealing with this issue.
Combining investigations into the metaphysics of time with the discipline of temporal logic this monograph brings about important advancements in the philosophical understanding of an ancient and fascinating problem. The answer, if any, is hidden in the folds of time, in the elusive nature of this feature of reality and in the infinite branching of our lives.