Dispositionalism: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science

ISBN-13: 9783030287214 / Angielski / Twarda / 2020 / 248 str.

Anne Sophie Meincke

Spis treści

Chapter 1. Dispositionalism: Between Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Anne Sophie Meincke).- Chapter 2. Ontology of Powers (John Heil).- Chapter 3. What Does the Doing? On Powers, Things and Powerful Things (Ruth Groff).- Chapter 4. Active Bearers: The Ontology of Mental Dispositions (Josef Quitterer).- Chapter 5. Powers, Activity and Interaction (Anna Marmodoro).- Chapter 6. What Are Manifestations? (Neil E. Williams).- Chapter 7. Dispositionalism, Persistence and Process (Anne Sophie Meincke).- Chapter 8. Powers, Probability and Statistics (Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford).- Chapter 9. What Powers Are Not (Elina Pechlivanidi and Stathis Psillos).- Chapter 10. A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions (Alexander Bird).- Chapter 11. Powers, Dispositions and Laws of Nature (Maximilian Kistler).- Chapter 12. Doing Away with Dispositions: Powers in the Context of Modern Physics (Steven French).- Chapter 13. Organic Powers (Matthew Tugby).- Index.

O autorze

Anne Sophie Meincke is a Senior Research Fellow at the Philosophy Department of the University of Vienna, Austria, and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Life Sciences at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. Meincke’s research lies at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of biology, with a special focus on elaborating a new process ontological perspective. She is currently PI of the ‘Elise Richter’ research project Bio-Agency and Natural Freedom, funded by the Austrian Science Fund (2019-2023). Previously, Meincke was a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Southampton, United Kingdom, and a Research Fellow at the Universities of Exeter, United Kingdom, and Innsbruck, Austria.

Blurb

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science.

The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue.