Disjunctivism : Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception

ISBN-13: 9780415623063 / Angielski / Twarda / 2012 / 176 str.

Marcus Willaschek

Opis

Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. This book offers 7 essays on disjunctivism.This book presents seven recent essays on disjunctivism first published in two special issues of Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action.

Spis treści

Introduction Marcus Willaschek  1. Transparency and imagining seeing Fabian Dorsch  2. Naïve realism and extreme disjunctivism M.D. Conduct  3. Perceiving events Matthew Soteriou  4. Tyler Burge on disjunctivism John McDowell  5. Disjunctivism and the urgency of scepticism Søren Overgaard  6. The disjunctive conception of perceiving Adrian Haddock  7. Disjunctivism again Tyler Burge

O autorze

Marcus Willaschek is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt am Main, Germany. He has published numerous articles on the philosophy of Kant, and on topics in the philosophy of action, free will and epistemology. He was an editor for the journalPhilosophical Explorations from 2005-2010.