Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations

ISBN-13: 9783642087929 / Angielski / Miękka / 2010 / 350 str.

Rudolf Avenhaus; I. William Zartman

Opis

In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. It examines how the abstract concept of formal models can be made more understandable to those not trained to work with them, what can be done to encourage the use of formal methods in the real world, and ways in which politicians and diplomats can apply formal methods to the problems they are currently facing.

Spis treści

Introduction: Formal Models of, in, and for International Negotiations.- Introduction: Formal Models of, in, and for International Negotiations.- General Evaluations.- Game Models of Peace and War: Some Recent Themes.- Formal Models of Intervention: A Stocktaking and Analysis of the Implications for Policy.- Rationality of Choice versus Rationality of Knowledge.- Negotiation Models and Applications.- Models of International Negotiations.- A Dynamical Systems Model of Small Group Decision Making.- Formal Methods for Forecasting Outcomes of Negotiations on Interstate Conflicts.- Bridging Games and Diplomacy.- Greek-Turkish Territorial Waters Game.- Models in International Negotiations.- Some Lessons from the Use of the RAINS Model in International Negotiations.- Converting Competition to Collaboration: Creative Applications of Models in the Law of the Sea Negotiations.- Models for International Negotiations.- International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Noncooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol.- The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a Tool for Negotiators.- A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties.- “Adjusted Winner” (AW) Analyses of the 1978 Camp David Accords—Valuable Tools for Negotiators?.- Procedural Design for Conflict Resolution.- Conclusion: Lessons for Theory and Practice.

Blurb

In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems?