Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers

ISBN-13: 9780521669603 / Angielski / Miękka / 1999 / 340 str.

David Epstein; Sharyn O'Halloran; Randall Calvert

Opis

In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.

Recenzje

'The creativity and care with which the data in this book were collected and analyzed sets a standard for empirical political science research. Epstein and O'Halloran's combination of theory and data yields an interesting and compelling case for their interpretation of delegation. This work is state of the art political science.' David Brady, Stanford University

Spis treści

1. Paths of policy making; 2. Choosing how to decide; 3. Transaction cost politics; 4. The decision to delegate; 5. Data and postwar trends; 6. Delegation and congressional-executive relations; 7. Delegation and legislative organization; 8. Delegation and issue areas; 9. Conclusion; Afterword on comparative institutions.