'Thomas Schwartz has been one of the handful of most important political science scholars in the formal study of properties of voting and social choice. He has made seminal contributions on topics such as logrolling, agenda manipulation, dimensionality of voting, and cycle sets. This book provides an integrated treatment of Schwartz's contributions over many decades. The ideas in it are relevant to anyone seriously interested in the study of democracy, regardless of whether their interests are primarily theoretical or primarily empirical.' Bernard Grofman, Jack W. Peltason Endowed Chair of Democracy Studies, University of California, Irvine
Introduction; 1. Condorcet's two discoveries; 2. Incidence of the paradox; 3. Social rationality; 4. Arrovian cycle theorems; 5. Second line of cycle theorems: Condorcet generalizations; 6. Top cycles in a fixed feasible set; 7. Strategic consequences of cycles; 8. Structural consequences of cycles; 9. Questions about prediction and explanation; 10. Questions about prescription and evaluation.