2. Richard Feldman, Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation
II. Practical Reasons for Belief?
3. Pamela Hieronymi, The Wrong Kind of Reason
4. Susanna Rinard, No Exception for Belief
5. Berislav Marusic, Promising Against the Evidence
III. Reliance
6. Dorit Ganson, Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief
7. Tamar Gendler Alief and Belief
8. Lara Buchak, Can it be Rational to Have Faith?
9. Jessica Brown, Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?
IV. Epistemic Dysfunctions
10. Miranda Fricker, Testimonial Injustice
11. Susanna Siegel, Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification
V. Virtue Epistemology
12. Linda Zagzebski, The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
13. Jennifer Lackey, Why We Don t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know
14. John Greco, A (Different) Virtue Epistemology
15. Ernest Sosa, TBA
VI. Disagreement
16. David Christensen, David, Epistemology of disagreement: The good news
17. Thomas Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
VII. Permissivism about Belief?
18. Roger White, Epistemic Permissivism
19. Miriam Schoenfield, Permission to believe: Why permissivism is true and what
Index
JEREMY FANTL is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary and has published papers and books in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and metaethics. His most recent book is The Limitations of the Open Mind (2018).MATTHEW MCGRATH is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and Professorial Fellow at the Arché Institute at the University of St. Andrews. He has published papers in epistemology and metaphysics, including Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009).ERNEST SOSA is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published in epistemology and metaphysics, including, most recently, Judgment and Agency (2015) and Epistemology (2017).