2. Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation Richard Feldman
II. Practical Reasons for Belief?
3. The Wrong Kind of Reason Pamela Hieronymi
4. No Exception for Belief Susanna Rinard
5. Promising Against the Evidence Berislav Marusic
III. Reliance
6. Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief Dorit Ganson
7. Alief and Belief Tamar Gendler
8. Can it be Rational to Have Faith? Lara Buchak
9. Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? Jessica Brown
IV. Epistemic Dysfunctions
10. Testimonial Injustice Miranda Fricker
11. Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification Susanna Siegel
V. Virtue Epistemology
12. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good Linda Zagzebski
13. Why We Don t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know Jennifer Lackey
14. A (Different) Virtue Epistemology John Greco
15. TBA Ernest Sosa
VI. Disagreement
16. Epistemology of disagreement: The good news David Christensen, David
17. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement Thomas Kelly
VII. Permissivism about Belief?
18. Epistemic Permissivism Roger White
19. Permission to believe: Why permissivism is true and what Miriam Schoenfield
Index
Jeremy Fantl is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary and has published papers and books in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and metaethics. His most recent book is The Limitations of the Open Mind.Matthew McGrath is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and Professorial Fellow at the Arché Institute at the University of St. Andrews. He has published papers in epistemology and metaphysics, including Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009).Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published in epistemology and metaphysics, including, most recently, Judgment and Agency (2015) and Epistemology (2017).