Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science

ISBN-13: 9781405113052 / Angielski / Miękka / 2006 / 368 str.

Robert Stainton

Opis

This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions.

• The debates are written by renowned experts in the field.
  
• The debates cover the middle ground as well as the extremes
  
• Addresses topics such as the amount of innate knowledge, bounded rationality and the role of perception in action.
  
• Provides valuable overview of the field in a clear and easily comprehensible form.

Recenzje

" Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science is an excellent introduction to debates in the philosophy of cognitive science. Many of this volume′s 18 previously unpublished papers also provide overviews of recent work by the authors, so this would also be a good choice for those who would like to keep up with the latest thinking of many leaders in the field." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"This is a remarkable volume. It’s an excellent text for upper division courses, and it also makes important original contributions to research on a number of “hot” topics in cognitive science." Stephen Stich, Rutgers University"

"This is an impressive collection of papers by a very strong group of philosophers. Students of philosophy and cognitive science will find that this book afffords a valuable introduction to a range of problems that are both basic and important. Experts will find that the papers make new and significant contributions to living debates. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the nature of mind and in the prospects for scientific understanding of its nature." Alva Noë, University of Caifornia, Berkeley

Spis treści

Notes on Contributors.

Preface.

Just How Modular Is The Mind?.

1. The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind Peter Carruthers.

2. Is the Mind Really Modular? Jesse Prinz.

3. Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? Richard Samuels.

How Much Knowledge Of Language Is Innate?.

4. Irrational Nativist Exhuberance Geoff Pullum and Barbara Scholz.

5. The Case for Linguistic Nativism Robert Matthews.

6. On the Innateness of Language James A. McGilvray.

Has cognitive science shown that human beings are cognitively bounded, or irrational?.

7. Bounded and Rational Gerd Gigerenzer.

8. Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue David Matheson.

Are rules and representations necessary to explain systematicity?.

9. Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules Terrence Horgan and John Tienson.

10. Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective Bill Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen.

Can consciousness and qualia be reduced?.

11. Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced William Lycan.

12. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced Brie Gertler.

Does cognitive science need external content at all?.

13. Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) Ray Jackendoff.

14. The Intentional Inexistence of Language Georges Rey.

Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?.

15. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? Kirk Ludwig.

16. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the ‘No’ Side Chris Viger.

Can mental states, knowledge in particular, be divided into a narrow component and a broad component?.

17. Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components? Tim Williamson.

18. The Internal and External Components of Cognition Ralph Wedgwood.

Index.

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O autorze

Robert J. Stainton is Associate Professor at the University of Western Ontario. He has published some 40 articles on various topics in linguistics and philosophy, and has authored or edited eight previous books, including Philosophical Perspectives on Language (1996), Knowledge and Mind (2000) and is co–editor of Philosophy and Linguistics (1999).

Blurb

This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions.

Renowned experts in the field contribute to the debates from different perspectives, covering the middle ground as well as the extremes. They address such topics as the degree of modularity of the mind, the amount of innate knowledge, whether human cognition is bounded, the role of perception in action, the place of external elements in mental states, and the importance of rules and representations for explaining systematicity.

The volume as a whole provides a valuable overview of the field in a clear and easily comprehensible form.