Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence

ISBN-13: 9781489983299 / Angielski / Miękka / 2014 / 116 str.

Ronald a Francisco

Opis

shift and dramatic improvementfrom the yearly data of the 1970s. For several years now, disaggregated methods (i. e., single-case comparisons) have been used to test theories (Davenport and Eads 2001; Rasler 1996; Francisco 1993, 1995, 1996). The single area of Snyder s(Snyder 1978)demandsthat has faltered is in linking levels of analysis in the eld of protest and repression. James DeNardo s (DeNardo 1985) and Lichbach s (Lichbach 1996) formal models have for the most part not beentestedempirically, norhaveRonaldWintrobe s(Wintrobe1998)modelsofd- tators strategic behavior. The dif culty stems from the disjuncture between game theory or micro models and macro, aggregate data. Green and Shapiro (Green and Shapiro 1994) took an extreme position on this problem: little empirical evidence from rational choice and game theory exists. To the extent that empirical evidence comprises our understanding of politics, rational choice and game theory have - guably contributed as much or more than any other approach. Think of interest group theory before Olson s The Logic of Collective Action, of electoral theory before Cox s (Cox 1997) Making Votes Count, or of coalition theory before Riker s (Riker 1963) The Theory of Political Coalitions. There are few social scientists who would not judge these books as great for economics and political science. Cox s book alone has won every major book prize appropriate in political science. On the normative side, too few political scientists researching democratization are aware of the theory of social choice. Its ndings challenge the foundations of democratic theory (Riker 1982)."

Spis treści

Testing Collective Action Theory.- Leadership and Mobilization.- Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest.- Dimensions of Space and Time in Protest and Repression.- Terror.- Evidence for Collective Action Theory.

Blurb

This book comprises empirical tests of the theoretical implications of collective action theory specifically with regard to mobilization. It is based on the author’s European Protest and Coercion Data, which won the Comparative Politics Section of American Political Science Association award for the best data set in 2007. The data are supplemented by historical investigations as well as other research. The volume is divided into six chapters. The introduction covers the theory of collective action in its many manifestations as well as the process of drawing out theoretical implications. The second chapter goes to the core of the mobilization issues, especially with regard to the role of leadership, which is inextricably linked to mobilization. The third chapter applies the concept of adaptation to the development of more productive tactics that promote mobilization in support of a public good and minimize the possibility of repression. In chapter four, five spatial hypotheses based on rationality and formal theories are developed and the role of time in protests is addressed. The fifth chapter focuses on the fundamental problems of terror with evidence from the Basque region of Spain and France from Ireland against the Provisional Irish Revolutionary Army in Northern Ireland. The final chapter surveys the empirical evidence and summarizes the support of collective action theory. Testing collective action theory implications with empirical evidence will appeal to political scientists, sociologists, economists and researchers concerned with mobilization.