Chinese Diplomacy and the Paris Peace Conference

ISBN-13: 9789811556357 / Angielski / Twarda / 2020 / 329 str.

Chi-hua Tang

Opis

This book examines Chinese diplomacy after the outbreak of World War One and the formation of power structures after 1914 in East Asia. Through close analysis of first-hand record such as the Diplomatic Archives, the author sheds light on the Chinese diplomatic experience at the Paris Peace Conference and debates key historical issues such as the alleged failure of Chinese diplomacy at the Paris conference in respect to the return of Shandong from German Occupation. The book offers a key re-interpretation and re-evaluation of Chinese participation in the Peace Conference and offers a new picture of this historical event.

Recenzje

"This is a remarkable book for two reasons at least: it sheds new light on the Chinese policy towards the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and it offers a glimpse at how Chinese historiography wants to present itself on today's world stage. ... Tang has written a fascinating account of Chinese participation in the peace settlement ... . His book will surely be picked by anyone interested in the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference." (Marcus M. Payk, Connections, October 28, 2022)

Spis treści

Introduction.- China’s Preparation for the Peace Conference during WWI.- Preparation for the Peace Conference after the Ceasefire of WWI.- The Diplomacy during the Peace Conference.- Refusal to Sign the Peace Treaty.- After the Refusal.- Conclusion.

O autorze

Qi-hua Tang is professor of the Department of History, Fudan University. He has published widely in the diplomatic history of the Republic of China, Anglo-Chinese relations, China’s international treaties, and the relationship between China and the League of Nations.

Blurb

This book examines Republican China’s diplomatic strategies and engagement, and power reconfiguration in East Asia after 1914. Drawing on a vast trove of primary sources, including newly declassified archival materials, the book offers not only a richly-informed account of how the Beiyang government conducted diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference but also new insights into why. Calling into question such long-held beliefs that the Beiyang government was inadequately prepared for the Conference, was treasonous in urging the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and that its behavior at the Conference amounted to a thorough failure of diplomacy, the author tries to make a case for a much more nuanced re-interpretation and re-evaluation of this critical period in the country’s diplomatic history.