CEO Pay and Shareholder Value: Helping the U.S. Win the Global Economic War

ISBN-13: 9781574442038 / Angielski / Twarda / 1997 / 160 str.

Ira T. Kay

Opis

Addressing the fundamental issue of whether or not CEOs are overpaid CEO Pay and Shareholder Value will help readers understand how business strategy, CEO pay, and long-term financial security are all linked. It explains how tying CEO performance to stock price benefits the U.S. economy; discusses how shareholders' interests can be aligned with those of executives and the broad employee population; considers the role of compensation programs in motivating growth, globalization, and efficiency; and compares U.S. economic practices with those of Japan and Europe, evaluating its global competitive advantage.

U.S. executive pay, particularly that of CEOs, has been under serious attack for nearly a decade. Despite the fact that tying executive performance and pay to stock price has appeared to have substantially benefited the U.S. economy, this criticism has not subsided. CEO Pay and Shareholder Value challenges some assumptions behind this criticism by addressing these pertinent questions and more:

Spis treści

Is There Pay for Performance?
We All Benefit When CEOs Perform
The Role of Executive Pay in the Global Economic War: A Comparison of the United States, Japan, and Europe
The Revolution in U.S. Corporate Governance and Its Impact on Executive Compensation
Synchronized Pay: A Solution for Improving All-Employee Performance
U.S. Executive Stock Ownership: A Source of Competitive Advantage
Epilogue: What if the Bulls Stop Running?
Selected Bibliography
Appendix A: Types of Long-Term Incentive Plans
Appendix B: The "Value" of an Employee Stock Option: A Brief Discussion of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model
Index

O autorze

Ira T. Kay