Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States

ISBN-13: 9781412842891 / Angielski / Twarda / 2011 / 224 str.

Jay Eungha Ryu

Opis

Bureaucracies have been criticized from various perspectives and blamed for a variety of failings. Critics have claimed that bureaucracies are too focused on conforming to rules rather than achieving an organization's core mission. Bureaucracies are said to oppress human freedom because of their orientation toward hierarchical control. Bureaucratic organizations are also said to be unable to deal effectively with public problems that span multiple administrative jurisdictions; they do not reach beyond their own organizational boundaries.This book provides solid data on how bureaucracies can expedite information processing and reduce organizational conflicts. Jay Eungha Ryu finds that the functions of bureaucracies are highly dependent upon external political conditions. Whether the executive and legislative branches are dominated by the same party significantly influences the ability of bureaucracies to function effectively.Ryu notes that the merits of bureaucratic centralization are worth close attention. Numerous attempts, including performance budgeting systems, have been made to improve bureaucratic malfunctions. However, such reform initiatives are doomed to failure, he argues, unless they employ a core feature of bureaucracy itself, centralization. Ryu defines bureaucratic centralization at its best as bounded bureaucracy. If well managed, bounded bureaucracy can substantially improve the rational behavior of organizations and reduce institutional frictions.

Spis treści

Preface
1 Bureaucraticization of Budget Processes: Causing or Remedying Bounded Rationality?
Bounded Rationality of Decision Makers
Bounded Bureaucracy as a Remedy to Bounded Rationality
Central Budget Offices: Enhancing Information
Processing and Reducing Institutional Conflicts
Bureaucracy to Save Bureaucratic Malfunctions
2 Bounded Rationality in Policy and Budget Processes
Bounded Rationality and Satisficing
Incrementalism
Serial Judgment
Disproportionate Information Processing
Conclusion
3 Bureaucratic Organizations as a Remedy to Bounded Rationality
Bureaucratic Organizations: Extending Human Cognitive and Analytical Capacities
Bureaucratic Centralization: Expediting Information Processing and Reducing Institutional Frictions
Bureaucratic Centralization and Moderating Impact of Organizational Strategies
Bureaucratic Centralization and Partisan Configurations
Conclusion: Bounded Bureaucracy to Bounded Rationality
4 Bureaucratic Centralization and the National Executive Budget Process
U.S. Budget Outcomes: 1961–2006
Bureaucratic Centralization in Presidents' Budgets
Institutional Frictions in the U.S. Budget Process
Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget
Punctuations 81
Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Stability
Conclusion
5 Bureaucratic Centralization and the Congressional Budget Process
Congressional Macrobudgeting: Institutions and Partisan Politics
The Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO): A Bipartisan Information Processor
Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Punctuations
Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Stability
Conclusion
6 Bureaucratic Centralization and the State Budget Process
State Budget Outcomes: 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2000
State Executive Budgets
State Legislative Budgets
State Budget Institutions: Item Veto and Balanced
Budget Requirements
Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States
Bureaucratic Centralization and State Budget Punctuations
Bureaucratic Centralization and State Budget Stability
Conclusion
Appendix: Legislative Professionalization and State Budget Punctuations and Stability
7 Conclusion: Bounded Bureaucracy to Bounded Rationality
Bibliography
Index

O autorze

Jay Ryu