Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control: Modern Empirical Developments

ISBN-13: 9780123819826 / Angielski / Miękka / 2010 / 1025 str.

B. Espen Eckbo

Opis

A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control," focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner's curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students' interaction with new concepts and applications.

• Provides a status report about modern scientific evidence on corporate takeovers
• Exposes students to new methods and empirical evidence while reading high quality primary material
• Offers a concise and cost-efficient package of journal and book articles for advanced corporate finance students

Spis treści

Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Empirical Developments; Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues; Auctions in Corporate Finance; Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review; Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle; Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market; Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction; Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11; Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales; Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions and Fire-Sales; Creditor Financing and Overbidding in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests; Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions; Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Anti-Takeover Measures; Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control; Let's Make a Deal! How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs; Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers; Investor Activism and Takeovers; Valuation Effects of Bank Financing in Acquisitions; Financing Decisions and Bidder Gains; Do Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions; CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses; Takeover Bids and Target Directors' Incentives: Retention, Experience, and Settling Up; Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring following Performance Declines; Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions; Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards as a Takeover Synergy in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions; Adopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers; Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions; Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions

O autorze

Professor B. Espen Eckbo holds the Tuck Centennial Chair in Finance. He is also Faculty Director of Tuck's Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance, which he founded in 1999. He teaches advanced MBA courses in the areas of corporate finance, corporate takeovers and international corporate governance. Professor Eckbo, who received a PhD in financial economics from the University of Rochester in 1981, has published extensively in the top finance journals in the areas of corporate finance, investment banking, and the market for corporate control. He is a recipient of an honorary doctoral degree from the Norwegian School of Economics, the prestigious Batterymarch Fellowship, as well as several outstanding-paper awards. He is a research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), and a frequent keynote and invited seminar speaker. He was called in 2009 by the U.S. Congress to testify on issues concerning the government's large equity ownership positions in companies rescued under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).