Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy

ISBN-13: 9783030807542 / Angielski / Twarda / 2022

Andreas Vrahimis

Recenzje

"Vrahimis' book is one of the first to rigorously consider the question of how the identity of analytic philosophy was constructed in relation to its antagonists. ... The book is an excellent introduction to the disruptive debates between leading philosophers of the twentieth century, it can easily function as a sourcebook for teaching and can do much to make philosophers review their prejudices concerning other traditions." (Ties van Gemert, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, March 15, 2023)

Spis treści

1 Introduction

Bibliography

2 Prelude: Bergsonism and Anglophone Analytic Philosophy

2.1 Before Stardom

2.2 Bergsonism in Britain and America

2.3 Stebbing’s Response to Bergson’s 1911 Lectures

2.4 Russell Meets Bergson

2.5 Costelloe-Stephen’s Response to Russell

Bibliography

3 Henri Bergson: A Misunderstood Celebrity

3.1 Bergson’s Historical Background

Spiritualism in Mid-Nineteenth-Century French Philosophy

‘Spiritualist Positivism’

3.2 A Biological Epistemology of Perception

3.3 Memory and Recognition

3.4 Intellect and Intuition

3.5 Philosophy of Space and Time

Beyond Spencer’s Evolutionary Epistemology

Number, Quantity, and Space

Durée

3.6 Science and Metaphysics

3.7 Language

Bibliography

4 William James and the Anglophone Reception of Bergsonism

4.1 A Philosophical Friendship

4.2 The Portrait of a Maître

4.3 Intellectualism

4.4 Bergson’s Radical Empiricism?

4.5 Radical Empiricism Versus Absolute Idealism

4.6 James’s Influence on Bergson’s Analytic Critics

Bibliography

5 ‘Ants, bees, and Bergson’: Bertrand Russell’s Polemic

5.1 Contra Anti-intellectualism

5.2 Number and Space

5.3 Zeno’s Paradoxes

Zeno’s and Bergson’s Solutions

Russell’s Mathematical Solution

Russell’s Objection to Bergson’s Solution, and the Debate with Carr

5.4 Time and Memory

5.5 Perception and the Subject-Object Distinction

5.6 Russell’s Later Responses to Bergson

‘Jupiter sometimes nods’

‘Evolutionism’ and Scientific Philosophy

Bergson’s Place in the History of Philosophy

Bibliography

6 ‘Analytic’ and ‘Synthetic’ Philosophy: Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s Defences of Bergson

6.1 Mereology

6.2 Recognition, Acquaintance, and the Limits of Thought

6.3 Costelloe-Stephen’s Reply to Russell

Space

Mathematical Continua and Processes of Change

6.4 Complexes and Syntheses

6.5 Russell’s Response to Costelloe-Stephen

6.6 Analytic Versus Continental ‘Synthetic’ Philosophy

Bibliography

7 A Call for Moderation: L. Susan Stebbing’s Critique of Bergson

7.1 How to Avoid Russell’s Errors

7.2 Bergson’s Historical Context

7.3 Bergson Versus the Pragmatists on Truth

7.4 ‘Anti-intellectualism’

7.5 Intuition and Argumentation

7.6 Stebbing’s Objections to Bergson’s Epistemology and Theory of Truth

7.7 Costelloe-Stephen’s Answer to Stebbing’s Objection

Bibliography

8 Entr’acte: Bergson’s Germanophone Reception and the Rise of Lebensphilosophie

8.1 The Philosophers’ Great War

8.2 The Demise of Bergsonism

8.3 The Rise of Lebensphilosophie

8.4 The Vienna Circle’s Opposition to Lebensphilosophie

8.5 Neurath’s Russellian Critique of Spengler

Bibliography

9 Evolutionary Epistemology: Moritz Schlick’s Critique of Intuition

9.1 Anti-biologism

9.2 Schlick’s Naturalised Epistemology

9.3 ‘Intuitive Knowledge’: A Contradiction in Terms

9.4 Images and Concepts

9.5 Judgements and Coordination

9.6 Philosophy’s ‘Great Error’ Revisited

Bibliography

10 From the Critique of Intuition to Overcoming Metaphysics: Schlick’s Dialogue with Carnap

10.1 Schlick on Intuition and Metaphysics

10.2 Carnap on Implicit Definitions and Structure Descriptions

10.3 Carnap’s Critique of Bergson

10.4 Schlick’s Answer to Carnap

10.5 Schlick’s Critique of Russellian Acquaintance

Bibliography

11 Different Kinds of Nothing

11.1 Carnap and Neurath Shift Their Target

11.2 Carnap on Heidegger’s Pseudo-statements

11.3 Carnap’s Response to Lebensphilosophie

11.4 Bergson and Carnap on Pseudo-problems About Nothing

11.5 Heidegger’s Angst Versus Bergson’s Disinterested Intuition

11.6 Sartre Responds to Bergson and Heidegger

11.7 Ayer Contra Sartre on Nothing and Negation

Bibliography

12 Doing Without Masters: Oxford Philosophy and the Analytic-Continental Divide

12.1 Ayer Revives Russell

12.2 Ryle Against the 1953 UNESCO Report

12.3 R.M. Hare’s Proposal for the Institutional Reform of Continental Philosophy

12.4 Ryle Against Continental ‘Fuehrership’

Bibliography

13 Conclusion

Bibliography

Index.

O autorze

Andreas Vrahimis works at the Department of Classics and Philosophy, University of Cyprus. His previous works include Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy (2013).

Blurb

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen.  Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart.