Bargaining in a Video Experiment: Determinants of Boundedly Rational Behavior

ISBN-13: 9783540654155 / Angielski / Miękka / 1999 / 221 str.

Heike Hennig-Schmidt

Opis

Bilateral bargaining situations are of great importance in reality. Traditional microeconomics, however, make cognitive and motivational assumptions of subjects' full rationality that are revealed as being unrealistic by a growing number of experimental investigations. The present book adds an important contribution to the understanding of principles of boundedly rational behavior by directly observing groups of subjects in a decision situation and videotaping their discussions. A very important result of the book is that the behavior of subjects is guided by aspirations regarding the final outcome. The levels of aspirations are influenced by prominence and different forms of the equity principle resulting in several fairness norms as to the allocation of the amount of money to be divided. Another important feature of the book stems from the analysis of break off discussions and enables a motivational explanation of the emergence of breakdowns in bargaining.

Spis treści

Content.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Description of the Experiment.- 2.1 Experimental Design.- 2.2 Organizational Features.- 3 Data and Evaluation.- 3.1 Experimental Setup.- 3.1.1 Spontaneous versus Strategic Behavior.- 3.1.2 Observation and Group Effect.- 3.1.3 Number of Sessions and Statistical Analysis.- 3.2 Evaluation.- 3.2.1 Data.- 3.2.2 Data Analysis.- 4 Determinants of Boundedly Rational Behavior.- 4.1 Aspiration Levels.- 4.2 Prominence.- 4.3 The Equity Principle and Fairness.- 4.3.1 The Equity Principle.- 4.3.2 Fairness.- 4.4 Motivations, Emotions, and Social Norms.- 5 Analysis of Payoffs and Proposals.- 5.1 Bargaining Models and Related Experiments.- 5.2 Payoffs.- 5.2.1 Inexperienced Groups.- 5.2.2 Experienced Groups.- 5.2.3 Group Effects.- 5.3 Proposals.- 5.3.1 Inexperienced Groups.- 5.3.2 Experienced Groups.- 5.3.3 Prominence Level of Proposals.- 5.4 Threats.- 5.4.1 Are Threats Successful?.- 5.4.2 Does Threatening Pay in Monetary Terms?.- 5.4.3 Do Threats Reduce the Bargaining Time?.- 5.5 Strategic Ideas.- 5.5.1 Constant Demand.- 5.5.2 “Jumping” between a Minimal Demand and a “Punishment Value”.- 5.5.3 Concessions to Reach an Agreement.- 5.5.4 Proposal of Equal Split by an S-group.- 5.5.5 Combinations of Behavior in 5.5.2 and 5.5.3.- 5.6 Conclusion.- 6 Equity and Prominence in Aspiration Levels and Proposals.- 6.1 The Equity Principle and Fairness.- 6.2 Prominence.- 6.3 Aspiration Levels.- 6.3.1 Formation and Adaptation of Aspiration Levels.- 6.3.2 Finding the First Aspiration Level.- 6.3.3 Adaptation of Aspiration Levels.- 6.3.4 Test of the Predictive Success of the Principles Guiding Aspiration Level Formation and Adaptation.- 6.4 Proposals.- 6.4.1 First Demands and Adjustments of Proposals.- 6.4.2 First Demands/Offers.- 6.4.3 Adjustments of Proposals.- 6.5 The Negotiation Agreement Area - Comparison of Results.- 6.6 Other Aspiration Level Based Approaches Explaining Outcomes of Bargaining.- 6.7 Conclusion.- 7 Break Offs.- 7.1 Correlates of Break Off Discussions.- 7.2 Monetary and Nonmonetary Motives.- 7.3 Motivations.- 7.3.1 Economic Efficiency.- 7.3.2 Power.- 7.4 Reciprocity, a Social Norm with Two Faces.- 7.4.1 Economic Literature on Reciprocity.- 7.4.2 Reciprocity in Break Off Discussions.- 7.5 Emotions.- 7.5.1 Emotions as Determinants for Primarily Non-Payoff-Oriented Break Off Discussions.- 7.5.2 Economic Literature Taking Account of Emotions.- 7.6 Motivational Explanation of Potential and Actual Break Offs.- 7.7 Conclusion.- 8 Conclusive Remarks: How Do Business People Decide?.- Appendices 137.- A Introduction of Experimental Subjects.- B Negotiation Processes.- C Negotiation Processes of the Kuon-Uhlich-Experiment.- D Allocations.- E Formation and Adaptation of Aspiration Levels.- F Break Off Discussions.- G Questionnaire for Business People.- References.