Averting Nuclear War

ISBN-13: 9783031386879 / Twarda / 2023

Jacek Kugler

Spis treści

Foreword by Ronald Tammen

1.     Introduction

This chapter overviews currently contradictory nuclear arguments by advocates of disarmament, deterrence, and warfighting.  Outside of the realm of deterrence looms the possibility that non-state agents will acquire and use dirty bombs.  Strategies to deal with this increasingly likely contingency are not in place.  As we move to a nuclear world beyond deterrence, we emphasize a need for the new strategic guidance to prevent the critical threats to human existence as we face an increasingly complex array of nuclear challenges.

2.     2. The Size and Scope of Nuclear Arsenals

This chapter provides a chronological snapshot of nuclear proliferation. We show that evolving technology and lack of commitment to established deterrence strategies causes the drastic rise in the size and composition of nuclear arsenals.  We e valuate the implications of primary events of nuclear competitions, including the arms race of strategic weapons, the deployment of tactical warheads, the transfer of weapons to regional powers. The decision of voluntary denuclearization is an important step that because of the lack of commitment by global nuclear powers has not secured societies that choose to do so. 

3.   3. The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in Theory and Practice

This chapter documents and analytically defines how and why the nuclear deterrence postures have shifted from Bernard Brodie's no-first-use doctrine under Massive Retaliation (MR) to Kenneth Waltz's neorealist principle of balance of terror under Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). We identify theoretical and practical inconsistency shared by both perspectives and evaluate the recent emergence of nuclear warfighting philosophy.

  4. 4.The Evolution of Disarmament in theory and Practice

Past works view deterrence and disarmament as alternate but contradictory paths to nuclear stability. We show that they are two sides of the similar attempts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.  Although the Global Zero movement has been endorsed by a vast number of academics and practitioners, this chapter shows that a major obstacle to such a disarmament proposal is the lack of trust among global powers that voids any attempts at enforceability. The practical alternative are regional nuclear-free zones first implemented after the Treaty of Tlatelolco that have now been adopted by the majority of nations south of the Equator. We show how and why NFZ can complement nuclear stability provided that the global nuclear powers guarantee regional stability.

5.     5. The Rise of Nuclear Warfighting Strategies

This chapter investigates the dynamics of nuclear escalation and the development of tactical nuclear strategies.  Exploring the evolution of warfighting strategies from their early inception, we first examine salient aspects of early counterforce and countervalue strategies. We then assess the tactical aspects of escalation theory evaluating the likely success if tactical nuclear strikes to prevent escalation.  

6.     Based on discussions from previous chapters, we develop a novel model that identifies and addresses all domains of nuclear challenges capable of inflicting grave loss of life and economic devastation. Unlike previous perspectives, our specification incorporates (a) the interaction between conventional and nuclear capabilities, (b) the policy motivation based on status quo evaluations and inter-state trust that can alter the perception of the security environment, and (c) the physical exposure to retaliation as the measurable component in the calculus of war. Our model Integrating Deterrence, Disarmament and War Fighting Strategies identifying the necessary but not sufficient conditions for different levels of nuclear war and those required for peace.  requirements

7.     6. Long Term Stability Beyond Deterrence

This chapter summarizes the implications of our perspective on nuclear stability. We show that deterrence under Massive Retaliation (MR) is unstable since a dissatisfied challenger with military superiority likely makes nuclear blackmail. Deterrence under Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is tenuous at global or regional levels since only under the balance of terror generated by nuclear parity military disputes can escalate to massive all-out nuclear war. We show that formulating and adopting warfighting strategies may potentially reduce costs of limited nuclear war but is unlikely to avert escalating conflicts at nuclear parity.  Lack of experience at this level of carnage and the lack of effective escalation theory identifying the cost threshold when war would stop is still missing (conventional conflict seldom exceeded 25% loss in any nation – such levels can be achieved in the nuclear era in days not years).  On the positive side we show that disarmament at the regional level can induce regional stability. We show that particularly to the Middle East a NFZ can enhance stability.  To generalize the benefits of NFZ we advocate the creation of a new, veto free Nuclear Security Council composed only of the few global nuclear powers. Once in place this institution would allow any global nuclear power to respond to a first strike in any region and particularly against any member of an NFZ. On a less optimistic note, we show that “global-zero” is not a feasible option today and can be considered only after establishing a trust-based security scheme.  The preconditions for such a venture are simply not in place.

Appendix 1: Systematic Analysis of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes 

This work summaries using an agent-based perspective the evolution and resolution of all nuclear crisis. We refer to these cases throughout the book.  The overall analysis shows that outcomes of crisis where threats of nuclear weapons use were involved did not differ from those where no such threats were used.  Based on structural conditions, the the number, intensity, and structure of outcomes do not differ from those in the pre-nuclear period.

8.     Appendix 2.  Formal Model specification and derivations

This section lays out theoretical justifications for our assumptions and specifications of the game-theoretic model of deterrence and disarmament. For interested readers, full equilibrium outcomes and their derivations are presented.

9.     References

10.  Subject Index

11.  Glossary of Terms

O autorze

Kyungkook Kang: Kyungkook Kang is Research Specialist of Decision Science at Loma Linda University. He also holds the position of Senior Fellow at the TransResearch Consortium, a nonpartisan think tank dedicated to the systematic analysis of transatlantic policy in the East and West. Kang's primary research focus lies in providing new strategic guidance to detect and deter security threats to U.S. vital interests. His current work aims to enhance the ability of policy leaders to assess the uncertain trajectories and potential turmoil associated with the emerging threats from global power transition. Prior to his affiliation with Loma Linda University, Kang served as Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. Kang has also taught at various institutions, including Claremont Graduate University, the University of Southern California, and La Sierra University. He is an expert in positive political economy and the use of decision-theoretic and computational methods employed to study social phenomena. Kang actively shares his research findings with policymakers and research analysts, aiming to bridge the gap between academia and practical implementation. His research interests cover a diverse range of topics within international politics and economics, including the dynamics of inter- and intra-state conflicts, the political economy of macro-economic policy, the U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region, and the policy of character-based human capital enhancement. Kang's contributions to the field have been published in academic journals such as International Studies Quarterly, Conflict Management and Peace Science, and International Interactions. He has also authored chapters in various books, with one of his notable recent works featured in "The Rise of Regions: Conflict and Cooperation" (2020, Rowman & Littlefield).

Jacek Kugler: Jacek Kugler is the Elisabeth Helm Rosecrans Professor of World Politics at Claremont Graduate University. He is recognized for his instrumental role in co-founding the TransResearch Consortium. Prior to joining Claremont, he held faculty positions at Boston University and Vanderbilt University. He has also taught at numerous other institutions, including Harvard, Caltech, War College, UCLA, and various international universities. He served as the president of the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, and he was the past editor of International Interactions. Over the past forty years, Kugler has been extensively involved as a policy consultant for various organizations, including the Intelligence Community, the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense, and the World Bank. He has provided valuable insights and recommendations through over 200 real-time reports, advising policymakers on important issues. Since 1968, Kugler has been deeply engaged in studying the long-term stability of nuclear deterrence under the guidance of Dr. Bernard Brodie. His deterrence work challenges prevailing policy arguments by showing that nuclear deterrence under Mutual Assured Destruction is tenuous and unstable. Kugler has made scholarly contributions across a wide range of topics, including global power transitions, the economic consequences of war, and the political performance of nations. His research has received significant support from organizations such as the Ford Foundation, NSF, USAID, DARPA, and the US Peace Institute. His publications, which include renowned books like "The War Ledger" (1980, University of Chicago Press) and "Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century" (2000, CQ Press), as well as numerous journal articles, have sparked extensive debates and discussions within the field of international relations. In recognition of his research contributions, he has been honored with numerous lifetime awards.

Blurb

This timely book offers a comprehensive examination of the current state of nuclear stability postures worldwide, effectively highlighting their inherent limitations. Through their analysis, the authors illustrate how the seemingly contradictory perspectives of deterrence optimists, disarmament idealists, and warfighting pessimists can be reconfigured into a unified approach towards achieving regional and global peace. They suggest that these strategies can be reconciled as complementary, rather than substitute approaches, to achieve the common goal of nuclear stability.

To achieve this objective, the book employs a game-theoretical framework to analytically define the conditions for nuclear war. Drawing from extensive observations of significant crises, the model incorporates identifiable systemic regularities that influence the strategic decision-making process during severe crises and establish the prerequisites for different levels of nuclear confrontation. Additionally, by tracing the strategic-technological trajectories of nuclear powers, the authors present a novel analysis that explores the potential for stable coexistence to replace unstable confrontation between global powers, ultimately fostering nuclear peace.

The author's theoretical explorations lead to the policy conclusion that establishing a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, under the leadership of preponderant global powers committed to a no-first-use pledge, presents the most effective international system for enhancing both regional and global nuclear stability. This book aims to surpass the Cold War origins of current nuclear strategy and develop a comprehensive policy framework that guarantees enduring nuclear stability in the contemporary world.