Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity

ISBN-13: 9781032191805 / Angielski / Twarda / 2022 / 196 str.

Roberto Di Ceglie

Opis

This book offers a new reading of Aquinas’ views on faith. The author argues that the theological nature of faith is crucial to Aquinas’ thought, and that it gives rise to a peculiar and otherwise incomprehensible relationship with reason.

Recenzje

"We might be tempted to think that there is nothing new to say when it comes to the perennial debate between faith and reason, but Di Ceglie artfully dismantles this notion by showing us that we remain gridlocked by the assumptions of modernity. He allows Aquinas's insights to shine through with their original splendor, revealing that authentic faith is not a source of naivete or hubris but rather a gift from God."

Stewart Clem, Aquinas Institute of Theology, USA

"This fine book ... is the product of an author who combines mastery of current analytical philosophy as well as of the last hundred years of Thomistic scholarship... The basic idea is that...Christians with a faith that is a virtue granted by God, occurring as 'perfected' by charity, would love exploring whatever invites engagement by our powers of reasoning...as Di Ceglie puts it...at the end of this splendid book"

Fergus Kerr in The New Blackfriars

"Di Ceglie offers a salutary correction to readings of Thomas that neglect faith's supernatural and volitional nature. His analysis of faith's merit, the preambles of faith, and unformed faith will be of particular interest to Aquinas specialists. Finally, his novel apologetic case for faith's value as a motivator of rational enquiry merits consideration and development."

Gregory Stacey in The Review of Metaphysics

O autorze

Roberto Di Ceglie is Full Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the Pontifical Lateran University, Italy. His essays have appeared in journals such as Philosophy, Philosophia, Sophia, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, and others. His book – God, the Good, and the Spiritual Turn in Epistemology – is forthcoming.