Antitrust Policy Versus Economic Power

ISBN-13: 9789020704730 / Angielski / Miękka / 1975 / 442 str.

Jack W. Aarts; J. W. Aarts

Opis

The gradual economic integration of Western Europe is bringing about far reaching changes in the countries taking part in the venture. One of the features of this process - and a prominent feature - is making itself felt in the field of industrial organization through a profound change in the structure of a large number of markets. In taking advantage of the larger market created by the elimination of national frontiers as barriers to trade, large firms playa leading role - firms from within the European Community and from outside. The merger device has been a major vehicle of expansion, and in several sectors of manufacturing industry this has already led to an in crease in the relative importance of a few firms. Over the years, public opinion has become increasingly aware of the con centration of industrial power and of itG attendant problems. Merger law and control of the operations of la: e corporations are current topics of discussion. More especially, merger statutes have recently been enacted in Britain and Germany, and the matter is coming to be one of the chief pre occupations of the European Commission."

Spis treści

1 Industrial Concentration and Economic Power.- 1 Industrial Concentration and Competition: An Appraisal.- 2 Factors Determining Concentration.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Economic Determinants of Corporate Growth.- 2.2.1 Factors Determining Plant Size.- 2.2.2 Factors Determining Firm Size.- 3 An Assessment of Concentration.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Criteria for Market Determination.- 3.2.1 The Product Dimension.- 3.2.2 The Geographic Dimension.- 3.2.3 Summary and Conclusions.- 3.3 Methods of Detecting Market Power.- 3.3.1 Introduction.- 3.3.2 Indicia of Market Power: The Competitive Environment.- 3.3.3 Indicia of Market Power: Behavior and Performance Standards.- 3.3.3.1 Corporate Behavior as Indicium of Market Power.- 3.3.3.2 Microeconomic Performance Standards.- 3.3.3.3 Macroeconomic Performance Standards.- 3.3.4 Summary and Conclusions.- 3.4 The Assessment of Mergers.- 3.4.1 Introduction.- 3.4.2 Horizontal Mergers.- 3.4.3 Vertical Mergers.- 3.4.4 Conglomerate Mergers.- 3.4.5 Joint Ventures.- 3.4.6 Summary and Conclusions.- 2 The Antitrust Laws Applied to Combination.- 4 The Law on Monopolies.- 4.1 Basic Ideas and Intent of the Antitrust Laws.- 4.1.1 The Common Law on Contracts in Restraint of Trade and Monopolies.- 4.1.2 Antitrust Measures Prior to the Sherman Act.- 4.1.3 Design and Content of the Sherman Act.- 4.1.4 Other Antitrust Laws. Enforcement Agencies. Exemptions.- 4.1.5 Summary and Conclusions.- 4.2 The Case Law on Monopolies.- 4.2.1 Content and Meaning of the Rule of Reason.- 4.2.2 The Law Applied to Trusts.- 4.2.3 The Case Law on Monopolies since 1945.- 4.2.4 The Case Law on Vertical Integration.- 4.2.5 Summary of the Law on Monopolies.- 4.2.6 A Critique of the Case Law.- 4.3 The Case Law on Oligopolies.- 4.3.1 Oligopoly Situations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.- 4.3.2 Oligopoly Situations under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.- 4.3.3 A Critique of the Case Law.- 5 The Law on Mergers.- 5.1 Merger Case Law under the Sherman Act.- 5.2 The Content of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.- 5.2.1 The Clayton Act of 1914.- 5.2.2 An Analysis of the Cases between 1914 and 1950.- 5.2.2.1 The Substantiality Test of Section 7.- 5.2.2.2 The Remedies under Section 7.- 5.2.2.3 The Applicability of Section 5 of the FTC Act.- 5.2.3 The 1950 Amendment (The Celler-Kefauver Act).- 5.2.3.1 Origins.- 5.2.3.2 An Analysis of the Text.- 5.2.3.3 The Scope of Section 7.- 5.2.3.4 Enforcement Agencies. Remedies.- 5.3 Interpretation of the Clayton Act (1): The Relevant Market.- 5.3.1 Introduction.- 5.3.2 Determination of the Product Market.- 5.3.3 Determination of the Geographic Market.- 5.3.4 Summary of the Case Law on Determination of the Relevant Market.- 5.4 Interpretation of the Clayton Act (2): The Substantiality Test.- 5.4.1 Horizontal and Vertical Mergers.- 5.4.1.1 The du Pont (General Motors) Decision.- 5.4.1.2 Lower Court and FTC Decisions before Brown Shoe.- 5.4.1.3 The Brown Shoe Decision.- 5.4.1.4 Supreme Court Decisions after Brown Shoe.- 5.4.1.5 Lower Court and FTC Decisions after Brown Shoe.- 5.4.1.6 Decisions in Private Injunctive Suits.- 5.4.2 Conglomerate Mergers.- 5.4.3 Joint Ventures.- 5.4.4 Mergers with Failing Companies.- 5.4.5 Remedies.- 5.5 A Summary of the Case Law.- 5.6 A Critique of the Case Law.- 3 The Limitations of Antitrust in Restraining Concentration.- 6 An Appraisal of the Impact of Antitrust.- 6.1 The Influence of Antitrust on the Pattern of Competition.- 6.1.1 The Impact of Government Action.- 6.1.2 The Prophylactic Influence of Antitrust Policy.- 6.1.3 Summary and Conclusions.- 6.2 Antitrust Judged by Its Objectives.- 6.3 Further Aspects of Competition on Concentrated Markets.- 7 Standards for a Policy toward Concentration.- 7.1 Market Power: The Limitations of Antitrust.- 7.1.1 The Notion of Market Power and the Law.- 7.1.2 The Enforceability of Direct Restraints on Market Power.- 7.1.3 The Enforceability of Restraints on Conduct.- 7.1.4 Conglomerate Power and the Antitrust Laws.- 7.2 Market Power: The Limitations of Instruments other Than Antitrust.- 7.3 The Limitations of Merger Policy.- 7.4 Competition Policy in Europe: The Present Position and Future Prospects.- 7.5 Summary and Conclusions.- Table of Cases.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.