Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm: Foundations of the Resource-Based View

ISBN-13: 9781107595781 / Angielski / Miękka / 2016 / 312 str.

Birger Wernerfelt

Opis

An up-to-date analysis of the theory of the firm, including the latest research on the resource-based view.

Recenzje

'This important book unifies two strands of Birger Wernerfelt's research that have heretofore been known to mainly separate audiences. His 'Resource-Based View' (1984) is a classic contribution to management. In contrast, Wernerfelt's recent papers on the 'Adaptation-Cost Theory' of the firm contribute to the economics literature launched by Coase and deepened by decades of subsequent research. Remarkably … the ACT not only motivates, develops and applies an important new source of exchange friction, it also provides the first unified account of the scope of firms, the size of markets, and the style of contracting - an impressive achievement and a high bar for future work. Most importantly, however, the RBV and the ACT can now be seen as two sides of the same coin; such dialogues and integrations between the management and economics literatures are enormously welcome. Robert S. Gibbons, Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Spis treści

Preface; Part I. Agenda: 1. Introduction; 2. Preview: small forces, high frequencies, and large firms; Part II. The Main Argument: 3. Adaptation costs in one dimension: firms, contracts, and price lists; 4. Adaptation costs in three dimensions: firms, markets, and contracts; 5. All adaptations are not the same: the scope of firms and the size of markets; 6. Resources and the scope of the firm; Part III. Implications: 7. The allocation of asset ownership; 8. Communication within and between firms; 9. The power of incentives within and between firms; 10. Decision-making in large organizations; Part IV. Empirical Tests: 11. Bargaining costs: existence and sub-additivity; 12. Adaptation frequency and the boundary of the firm; 13. Asset ownership and externalities; Part V. Foundations: 14. Endogenously incomplete contracts; 15. Multiple equilibria and firm heterogeneity; 16. On the endogenous amplification of small differences; Part VI. Postscript: 17. Summary and final reflections; Index.