Foundations in Microeconomic Theory: A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein

ISBN-13: 9783642093395 / Angielski / Miękka / 2010 / 541 str.

Matthew O. Jackson; Andrew McLennan

Opis

What a wonderful occasion it is to be celebrating 65 years of Hugo Sonn- schein Given his many contributions to economic research and academia more broadly, there is much to celebrate. This volume, presented to Hugo at a confer ence in his honor at the University of Chicago in October 2005, highlights one of his deepest contributions. It is perhaps the hardest to detect from reading his bios and vita; but something that he is famous for among economists in general and economic theorists in particular. It is his incredible record as a mentor and advisor of students. In putting this volume together, we have collected papers from Hugo's students with the aim of demonstrating his tremendous impact as an advisor. The papers span decades, with the earliest coming from his advisees in the first years of his career and the most recent coming in the last two years after his return to research and advising that followed his adventures as a university administrator. The con tributors include not only his graduate advisees, but also some of his undergraduate advisees and still others who did not have him as an advisor, but nonetheless con sider him a primary mentor in their training as economic theorists. Each paper is accompanied with a brief preface by the student that provides background on the paper and indicates Hugo's influence on its genesis."

Spis treści

An Existence Theorem for the Second Best.- An Equilibrium Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible, Competitive Prices and Wages.- Price Distortion and Potential Welfare.- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance.- Residential Land Use.- Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry.- Power, Majority Voting, and Linear Income Tax Schedules.- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium.- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information.- Finitely Repeated Games.- Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans.- Strategy-Proof Exchange.- Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods.- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-up Problem.- The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result.- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games.- Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction.- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.- Player Type Distributions as State Variables and Information Revelation in Zero Sum Repeated Games with Discounting.- Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships.- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods.